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Quality-based payment in healthcare—also known as pay-for-performance—is a
popular policy intervention aimed at improving healthcare quality. However, there has
been little theoretical work characterizing the underlying quality problem or the
interaction between pay-for-performance and existing payment mechanisms.
Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence that pay-for-performance has a substantial
eﬀect on healthcare quality.
In chapter , I develop a model of provider competition on two dimensions of quality
and show that the eﬃcient pay-for-performance contract corrects a market failure by
rewarding dimensions of quality that are under-supplied in the existing system. I argue
that provider allocation of eﬀort to various tasks is ineﬃcient without
pay-for-performance, a multitasking problem that can be mitigated by an optimally
designed pay-for-performance contract.
In , U.K. National Health Service implemented the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF), a new contract that rewarded primary care practices based on a wide
range of quality measures. In chapters  and , I use electronic medical record data from
 practices to analyze how practices responded to the QOF.
Chapter  analyzes practice performance on quality of care for coronary heart disease,
diabetes, and chronic kidney disease. I ﬁnd that over the ﬁrst two to three years of the
QOF, overall quality of care improved in each domain, with improvements in both care
processes and intermediate outcomes.
Chapter  investigates the speciﬁcity with which practices responded to the new
incentives under QOF, focusing on the following thresholds: () performance ceilings
above which practices do not receive additional payment, () test score thresholds that
deﬁne success or failure on a quality indicator, and () end-of-ﬁscal-year eﬀects
introduced by annual reporting of results. I ﬁnd discrete diﬀerences in provider behavior
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around each of these thresholds.
This dissertation makes three major contributions to the literature on quality-based
payment, showing the following: () the design of quality-based payment contracts should
consider interactions with the existing payment system; () a new quality-based payment
contract in the United Kingdom was associated with improved quality of care; and () GP
practices responded to speciﬁc marginal incentives, implying that quality-based payment
should align incentives with desired provider responses.
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Integrating Pay-for-Performance into
Health Care Payment Systems
. I
H
     U.S. and U.K. is widely believed to be ineﬃciently low,
considering the resources devoted to the health care sector (McGlynn et al., ;
Seddon et al., ). One commonly cited reason for this ineﬃciency is the inability of
health care consumers to observe quality of care, which leads to low demand response to
provider quality (Weisbrod, ). Pay-for-performance is one popular potential solution,
whereby a payer directly rewards quality. The most ambitious pay-for-performance
program to date is the U.K. National Health Service’s (NHS) Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF), where about a quarter of payments to general practitioners are based
on performance on a range of quality indicators (Roland, ). In the U.S., accountable
care organizations (ACOs), part of the Aﬀordable Care Act of , are an attempt to lowercosts and improve quality by augmenting fee-for-service payment with quality-based
payment and provider rewards (or penalties) for lower (or higher) than expected costs
(McClellan et al., ). In this paper, I consider how payers should approach
quality-based payment, in light of the market failures such payments are addressing and
the interaction of quality-based payment with existing payment mechanisms.
The fundamental insight that I explore in this paper stems from the recognition that
some attributes of health care are easier for consumers to observe than others. We should
expect traditional payment systems to result in under-provision of those attributes that are
poorly-observed by consumers, but not those that are well-observed. This insight seems
not to have been considered by major payers implementing pay-for-performance contracts,
which have included payments for those aspects of quality that are best observed by
patients. In the QOF, up to % of quality-based payments have been based on patient
experience, and the Institute of Medicine recommended that payments for
patient-centeredness of care comprise roughly one-third of quality-based reimbursement
for providers (Institute of Medicine, ).
Major payers seem to be providing quality-based payment based on the value
associated with improved quality. However, as long as consumers base their choice of
provider partially on provider quality, and providers receive more net income when they
attract more patients, providers already have incentives to invest in quality. In this paper, I
recognize that providers have existing incentives to set quality, and treat optimal
quality-based payment as a mechanism design problem. Incentives for quality may need
correcting, but to do so we ﬁrst need to characterize those incentives and understand the
nature of the ineﬃciencies in existing payment systems. As mentioned above, existing
payment systems may result in ineﬃciently low quality choices by providers due to
imperfect observability of quality by consumers. But in this case, bundled (prospective)
There is extensive evidence that, at least in the case of hospital care, there is meaningful demand response to
quality (Howard, ; Tay, ).
We might also worry that provider market power will result in ineﬃcient quality choices, even in the absence of
imperfect information, as illustrated in the classic paper by Spence (). In this paper, I assume equal marginal
payments provide incentives to invest in well-observed aspects of quality (to which
demand is responsive), and not in poorly observed aspects of quality. This is a classic
multitasking problem, occurring in the absence of any quality-based payment.
Multitasking—in which contracts rewarding one dimension of eﬀort reduce eﬀort on
other, unrewarded, dimensions—has long been a concern with pay-for-performance
contracts (Holmstrom and Milgrom, ). Only some aspects of medical care are
measurable by payers (and therefore contractible); depending on the health care
production function, payment based on the measurable aspects of quality may reduce
eﬀort on unmeasurable (but still important) aspects. However, a health care payer
observes consumer demand as well as some aspects of quality: depending on the nature
of the demand function, quality-based payment may in fact be used to reduce
multitasking problems associated with traditional, demand-based, payment contracts.
Other papers have considered quality-based payment as a response to the multitasking
problem in health care, but these papers have not addressed the possibility of demand
response to quality informing optimal payment contracts (Eggleston, ; Kaarboe and
Siciliani, ).
In a  paper, Ma showed that bundled payment can achieve the eﬃcient level of
quality, so long as there is some positive demand response to quality. However, his
conclusions depend on a one-dimensional model of quality; as I show in this paper, these
conclusions fail when there are multiple dimensions of quality that are diﬀerently
observable to patients. This is likely the case in most health care markets: for example,
most patients observe how much time a physician spends with them (dimension ), but
few patients know whether the physician prescribed an appropriate medication
(dimension ). Demand will then be relatively more responsive to time spent with
patients, compared to appropriate prescribing. Once we go beyond one-dimensional
beneﬁts across consumers, so facing informed consumers, the providers would choose eﬃcient quality levels.
Note that in some cases, such as in this example, the dimension that is relatively well-observed by consumers
will be one that is poorly observed by payers. Unqualiﬁed references to ”observability” in this paper will denote
observability by consumers. Note also that observability by the payer depends on technology. For example,
quality, bundled payment is no longer suﬃcient to achieve the eﬃcient quality level: there
is a multitasking problem in which providers have an incentive to over-provide the
dimensions of quality that are well-observed by patients, relative to dimensions of quality
that patients observe poorly.
In this paper, I consider a model of quality competition between two proﬁt-maximizing
providers, in which there are two dimensions of quality that are imperfectly observed by
patients. A payer oﬀers a payment contract to the providers, attempting to induce eﬃcient
provider choices on both dimensions of quality. Under a traditional bundled
(demand-based) payment system, providers over-invest in the better-observed dimension
of quality. However, once a payer can implement pay-for-performance, it is possible to
induce the eﬃcient level of both dimensions of quality. Critically, this depends on
rewarding the poorly observed dimension of quality (or penalizing the well-observed
dimension of quality); it does not involve rewarding the dimension of quality that
contributes more to patient health outcomes or patient utility.
In their chapter on physician pay-for-performance, Golden and Sloan () present a
list of system design questions, including the following: ”Which outcome measures will
be part of the payment scheme, and by implication, which are considered either less
important or too diﬃcult to measure reliably?” This reﬂects the common understanding
that when designing pay-for-performance contracts, we should reward dimensions of
quality that are important (presumably in terms of improving health outcomes). In this
paper, I will argue that this understanding is incomplete: quality-based payments should
reward those aspects of quality with the greatest ineﬃciencies caused by existing payment
mechanisms. These targeted dimensions of quality may or may not be the most important
in terms of their eﬀect on health outcomes.
with near-universal adoption of electronic medical records among primary care practices in the U.K., it is
feasible for the NHS to observe details of medical records that would be prohibitively costly for Medicare to
observe. Finally, observability by payers may depend on satisfying incentives for honest reporting of treatment
by providers and patients (Ma and McGuire, ).
. E  --
Although there has been enthusiasm for pay-for-performance from both public and
private payers (Institute of Medicine, ), the evidence on provider responses to
quality-based payment is decidedly mixed (Rosenthal and Frank, ). Most studies tend
to ﬁnd little or no quality improvements associated with pay-for-performance, but nor
does multitasking seem to have been a big problem in general. That said, all
pay-for-performance programs thus far have been plagued by low marginal incentives for
providers: either there is little money on the table, relative to provider income; or targets
have been set such that most providers do not need to improve quality to meet the targets.
Starting in , major private payers in California began providing direct incentives
for performance on a variety of process-based quality measures: PaciﬁCare implemented
its Quality Improvement Program (QIP) in , and was joined by several other payers
(the Integrated Healthcare Association, or IHA) in . Payment under these programs
was relatively low; although the IHA was responsible for about % of medical groups’
capitated revenues, annual quality-based payments per patient never rose above . Two
papers analyzing the QIP and IHA initiatives ﬁnd little evidence of overall improvement
in performance or of multitasking problems (Mullen et al., ; Rosenthal et al., ).
Interestingly, with the QIP, the lowest-performing medical groups improved quality the
most, despite the contract providing little additional marginal incentive for them to
improve. (Payment was given to practices that reached a set threshold, so few of the
low-performing practices were likely to receive payment.) Although this could be
attributable to regression to the mean, it perhaps suggests that factors other than marginal
ﬁnancial incentives or public reporting are aﬀecting the results (in this program, public
reporting had been in place for several years before pay-for-performance implementation).
Several papers have attempted to evaluate the eﬀects of the NHS QOF, and there is
suggestive evidence that some processes of care may have improved, with perhaps only
minor multitasking problems (Campbell et al., ; Doran et al., ). However, the
highest-powered and best-identiﬁed study to date estimates a precise zero-eﬀect on
various processes and health outcomes among patients with hypertension (Serumaga
et al., ). The quality-based payments under the QOF are large; starting with full
implementation in , the maximum payment for an average practice was roughly
£, (,). However, it seems that the marginal incentives for improvement were
small: the median practice earned .% of the available payments in the ﬁrst year after
implementation (Doran et al., ).
. M
I consider a model with two-dimensional quality, (q1,q2). A social planner is the only
payer for health care services, and chooses a payment schedule. Depending on regulatory
and informational constraints, payment may be based on patient demand (quantity), cost,
and/or quality. There are two providers, each having the same constant-returns-to-scale
technology and choosing quality levels (q1,q2), with strictly convex cost per patient
c(q1,q2). Quantity demanded is determined by quality competition between providers at
ﬁxed locations, with provider a located at point , provider b located at point , and unit
measure of consumers distributed uniformly on [0,1]. Each consumer has unit demand,
and a consumer traveling distance d to provider j receives utility q1j + q2j   td, where t is a
known, strictly positive cost-of-travel parameter. Each consumer has independent
probabilities ( 1, 2) of observing quality dimensions (q1,q2) of both providers. Each
It is possible that the marginal incentives were large, and practices simply improved drastically in the ﬁrst year
after implementation; however, it is undeniable that marginal incentives for improvement were small in all
years after the ﬁrst.
Here we can think of a consumer demanding health care for a given period of time, and signing up with a
provider for that time. Alternatively, we may think of a sick consumer demanding health care from a single
provider for a given episode of treatment. In either case, aspects of care that are often considered to be quantity
(such as number of visits or number of procedures) will contribute to the quality of the single unit of care
demanded. When providers have the ability to set quantity, as is typically assumed to be the case in many
health care markets (McGuire, ), there is no fundamental distinction between quantity- and quality-based
competition (Tirole, ).
In my model, it is this imperfect observability of quality that results in low demand response to quality (relative
to what demand response would be if consumers fully valued the beneﬁt they received from higher quality
care). However, the conclusions of this paper are not dependent on the mechanism underlying the low demand
consumer has beliefs about any quality dimensions that are unobserved to that consumer
(and in equilibrium these beliefs will be correct), and chooses the provider who
maximizes the consumer’s utility. Prices faced by consumers are administratively set such
that no patient chooses an outside option.
Thus, the game proceeds in three stages:
. Social planner chooses a provider payment contract (in each case I consider below,
several of these payment parameters will be constrained to equal zero):
(a) Bundled payment pb is paid per unit of demand.
(b) Quality payments per unit demand p1 and p2 are paid per unit of q1 and q2,
respectively.
(c) Cost-based reimbursement 0   pc < 1 is reimbursement as a percentage of
provider costs.
. Proﬁt-maximizing providers a and b choose non-negative quality vectors (q1a,q2a)
and (q1b,q2b), respectively. Provider j’s cost per patient is a strictly increasing,
strictly convex, continuously diﬀerentiable function c
(
q1j,q2j
)
, with c(0,0) = 0,
c1 (0,x) = 0, and c2 (x,0) = 0, x   [0,¥). (Note that ci represents the partial
derivative of c
(
q1j,q2j
)
with respect to its i’th argument.) Alternatively, providers
may choose to exit the market and receive zero proﬁts.
. Consumers have independent probabilities  1, 2   (0,1) of observing quality
dimensions (q1,q2) of both providers. A consumer at point i choosing provider a
receives utility u(q1a,q2a,i) = q1a + q2a   ti; the same consumer choosing provider b
response to quality. Other plausible mechanisms include the presence of positive externalities to medical
treatment or lack of information about the value associated with higher quality care. Note further that in my
model, the independence of  1 and  2 is not necessary for any of the conclusions to go through; this
assumption simply aﬀords greater ease of exposition.
Most models of healthcare providers’ utility functions include some degree of altruism (McGuire, ); the
proﬁt-maximization assumption does not substantially aﬀect my results, unless provider altruism favors one
dimension of quality over the other. So long as altruism is modeled as the patient’s utility entering the provider’s
utility function, altruism will simply result in lower payments being required to attain eﬃcient quality levels.
receives utility u(q1b,q2b,i) = q1b + q2b   t   (1  i). Each consumer has beliefs about
provider quality choices that are unobserved by that consumer, and according to
those beliefs chooses the provider that maximizes the consumer’s utility.
Consumer choices in stage  imply a demand function for provider j of
 j
(
q1j,q2j,q1, j,q2, j
)
. Proﬁt to provider j is:
 j = p1q1j j + p2q2j j + pb    j + pc   c
(
q1j,q2j
)
   j   c
(
q1j,q2j
)
   j
=  j  
[
p1q1j + p2q2j + pb   (1  pc)   c
(
q1j,q2j
)]
Since payment to providers is simply a transfer, net social welfare is given by:
SW (q1a,q2a,q1b,q2b) =
1 ∫
i=0
ui (q1a,q2a,q1b,q2b)di    a   c(q1a,q2a)    b   c(q1b,q2b)
. C  
In this section, I solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under diﬀerent regulatory regimes.
Depending on contractibility, the social planner will be constrained to set some of the
payment parameters equal to zero. In the subsections below, I derive demand, solve for
providers’ proﬁt-maximizing quality choices, and solve for the planner’s constrained
optimum under various regulatory regimes.
.. D
First, I derive demand for provider j as a function of (q1a,q2a,q1b,q2b). I denote as ˜ qkj the
consumer’s belief about provider j’s choice on quality dimension k. The probability that
consumer i chooses provider a is:
 ia = (1   1)(1   2)1[˜ q1a+˜ q2a ti ˜ q1b+˜ q2b t(1 i)] +
 1 (1   2)1[q1a+˜ q2a ti q1b+˜ q2b t(1 i)] +
(1   1) 21[˜ q1a+q2a ti ˜ q1b+q2b t(1 i)] +
 1 21[q1a+q2a ti q1b+q2b t(1 i)]
Assuming that absent additional information, consumers believe the two providers
choose the same quality vectors, this reduces to:
 ia = (1   1)(1   2)1[i  1
2] +  1 (1   2)1[
i  1
2+
q1a q1b
2t
] +
(1   1) 21[
i  1
2+
q2a q2b
2t
] +  1 21[
i  1
2+
q1a+q2a q1b q2b
2t
]
Deﬁne g(x) = max(0,min(1,x))  x   R. Demand for provider a is given by the
following semi-diﬀerentiable function:
 a =
1 ∫
i=0
 iadi
= (1   1)(1   2)
1
2
+  1 (1   2)   g
(
1
2
+
q1a   q1b
2t
)
+
(1   1) 2   g
(
1
2
+
q2a   q2b
2t
)
+  1 2   g
(
1
2
+
q1a + q2a   q1b   q2b
2t
)
Since there is unit measure of consumers, each with unit demand, demand for provider
b is given by  b = 1   a. Note that with ( 1, 2) ≪ (1,1), demand is strictly positive for
both providers. Furthermore, deﬁne
  a
 qka =
  b
 qkb =
  
 qk, k    1,2 . Finally, note that where
1[logical expression] is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if logical expression is true and 0 otherwise.
Note that there could be other reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium-path beliefs (for example, a consumer observing a
provider choosing higher-than-expected q1might also believe the provider chose higher-than-expected q2.
However, if a patient observing one dimension of quality can infer the other dimension, both dimensions have
become equally observable.
  
 qk is undeﬁned, we have
 + a
 qka =
   b
 qkb and
   a
 qka =
 + b
 qkb .
.. P -
Provider a’s proﬁt-maximization problem is then given as:
max
q1a,q2a
 a (q1a,q2a;q1b,q2b, 1, 2,t)
=  a (q1a,q2a;q1b,q2b, 1, 2,t)   [p1q1a + p2q2a + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1a,q2a)]
First-order conditions for a maximum are given by:
k    1,2 ,
  a
 qka
=
  a
 qka
  [p1q1a + p2q2a + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1a,q2a)] +
 a  
[
pk   (1  pc)  
 c
 qka
]
  0 (..)
qka  
  a
 qka
= 0
Given c(0,0) = 0, c1 (0,x) = 0, and c2 (x,0) = 0, x   [0,¥): if p1, p2, and pb are
non-negative and if
  a
 qka is deﬁned then expression (..) must hold with equality in
equilibrium. The critical points where
  a
 qka is undeﬁned occur where qka = qkb   t or
q1a + q2a = q1b + q2b   t.
The physician’s individual rationality constraint is given by
p1q1 + p2q2 + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1,q2)   0.
Proposition. Given a single payment contract, any equilibrium must be symmetric: q1a = q1b;
q2a = q2b. Proof in appendix.
Note that at a symmetric equilibrium, we have a linear demand curve with respect to
Later in the paper, we will consider cases where the planner sets a negative value for p1, p2, or pb. However, it
will never be socially optimal for the planner to set these values suﬃciently negative that a corner solution is
induced. This follows from c(0,0) = 0, c1 (0,x) = 0, and c2 (x,0) = 0.
each quality dimension:
  
 qk =
 k
2t . Substituting into our ﬁrst-order conditions yields:
 k
2t
  [p1q1a + p2q2a + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1a,q2a)] +  a
[
pk   (1  pc)  
 c
 qka
]
  0
Second-order conditions are given by:
SOC1 :
 1
t   [p1   (1  pc)c1]       (1  pc)c11
SOC2 :
 2
t   [p2   (1  pc)c2]       (1  pc)c22
SOC3 :
[
 1
t   [p1   (1  pc)c1]       (1  pc)c11
]
 
[
 2
t   [p2   (1  pc)c2]       (1  pc)c22
]
 
[
 1
2t [p2   (1  pc)c2] +
 2
2t [p1   (1  pc)c1]       (1  pc)c12
]2
At any stationary point, the following two conditions are suﬃcient to satisfy the
second-order conditions: () pc   1, and () pk   (1  pc)ck, k    1,2 . Condition ()
holds at any solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions. Condition () will hold at a solution to
the ﬁrst-order conditions when p1q1a + p2q2a + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1a,q2a)   0; that is, the
net income per patient is positive, which is required to satisfy the provider’s individual
rationality constraint.
.. R
The social planner’s problem is to maximize social welfare subject to the constraints
imposed by provider proﬁt-maximizing. Note that given a symmetric solution (and
correct beliefs on the equilibrium path), all consumers with i   1
2 will choose provider a,
with the remainder choosing provider b. This implies that the planner cannot aﬀect the
travel costs to consumers, and the social planner’s objective reduces to:
max SW = q1 + q2   c(q1,q2)
This is a strictly concave objective function, and the ﬁrst-best solution has c1 = c2 = 1.
The social planner’s constraints for an interior solution are given by:
FOC1 : (1  pc)    c
 q1   p1 =
 1
t   [p1q1 + p2q2 + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1,q2)]
FOC2 : (1  pc)    c
 q2   p2 =
 2
t   [p1q1 + p2q2 + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1,q2)]
IR : p1q1 + p2q2 + pb   (1  pc)   c(q1,q2)   0
This can be thought of as an instruments and targets problem: the socially optimal
values of q1 and q2 are the two targets, and the planner will generally need two
independent instruments to achieve the targets.
.. P       -  (  NHS )
From the inception of the NHS until , primary care practices were paid almost
entirely based on capitation (bundled payment). In this subsection, I will consider a case
where the planner is constrained to set all reimbursement other than pb and pc equal to
zero, and show that no such mix of bundled and cost-based payment can induce eﬃcient
quality choices by providers unless  1 =  2. (The traditional NHS model is the speciﬁc
case where pc = 0.) The planner’s problem is:
max
pb, pc
SW = q1 + q2   c(q1,q2)
s.t. FOC1 : (1  pc)   c1 =
 1
t [pb   (1  pc)c]
FOC2 : (1  pc)   c2 =
 2
t [pb   (1  pc)c]
IR : pb   (1  pc)c
If  1 =  2 =  , then the ﬁrst-best is achievable by setting
pb
1 pc = c  + t
 , where c  is the
value of the cost function where c1 = c2 = 1. Otherwise, the ﬁrst-best is not achievable,
since with  1 ̸=  2, c1 ̸= c2. Although we have two instruments (pb and pc) and two
targets (q1 and q2) the instruments are collinear with respect to the targets. In this case,
providers choose quality such that
c1
c2 =
 1
 2: there is a multitasking problem, with
over-investment in the better-observed dimension of quality, relative to the less-observed
dimension of quality.
Ma () showed that bundled payment can be set to achieve the right overall level of
quality, with a similar result that the optimal bundled payment varies with the inverse of
the demand response to quality. However, my model adds an additional dimension of
quality, and when there is diﬀerential demand response to diﬀerent dimensions of quality
( 1 ̸=  2), it is impossible to achieve the ﬁrst-best with bundled payment. Bundled
payment is thus unable to address the multitasking problem associated with diﬀerential
demand response to diﬀerent aspects of quality. In order to do so, we will need an
additional policy instrument.
.. P  --  (  M )
Since the implementation of the Resource Based Relative Value Scale for Part B Medicare
payments in , physician payments have been based on the total number of procedures
and Medicare’s estimate of the average resources needed to provide those procedures.
Note that this is not cost-based reimbursement, since a physician who uses fewer
resources to provide a given procedure pockets the diﬀerence in resources used. This can
be modeled by thinking of the number and intensity of procedures provided to a patient
as q1 and the quality of those procedures (or possibly coordination of care) as q2. In this
case the planner is constrained to set all reimbursement other than p1 equal to zero. The
planner’s problem is:
max
p1
SW = q1 + q2   c(q1,q2)
s.t. FOC1 : c1   p1 =
 1
t [p1q1   c]
FOC2 : c2 =
 2
t [p1q1   c]
IR : p1q1   c
The ﬁrst-best is achievable if and only if  2 =  1 +
 2c +t
q 
1
=
t+ 1q 
1
q 
1 c  >  1. Unless  1 is
much lower than  2, treatment-intensity-based payment will result in over-provision of q1
relative to q2.
Compared to the results in subsection .. above where pb rewards the dimension of
quality to which demand is more responsive, in this case, p1 rewards both overall demand
and q1 speciﬁcally. Here we have providers choosing quality such that
c1 p1
c2 =
 1
 2,
compared to
c1
c2 =
 1
 2 in subsection ... This implies that, compared to bundled
payment, payment based on q1 will get us closer to the social optimum where c1 = c2 = 1
only when  1 is substantially lower than  2.
.. P    -  (  M  NHS -
)
Under the NHS QOF, payment to primary care practices is a mix of capitation and
quality-based payment. The QOF pays for a wide range of quality measures, but no
quality-based payment contract can pay for all dimensions of quality.
Payment under Medicare ACOs is based on Medicare’s traditional intensity-based
payment (paying on q1). However, a provider who costs less than expected (provides a
lower q1) shares in the savings to the system, and a provider who costs more than
expected (provides a higher q1) is not paid as much as under traditional Medicare
payment. This can be modeled as bundled payment, plus lower p1 than was the case in
Note that I have assumed linear quality-based rewards: the payment function f (q1) = p1q1. If we remove the
restriction of linearity and allow any payment function, we can achieve the ﬁrst-best by inserting a step
discontinuity at q 
1 and setting f (q 
1) = c  + t
 2 . If  1    2, then it is necessary for f (q1) to decrease above q 
1.
This is a description of one of the two payment options for ACOs, in which providers have symmetric
incentives above and below the traditional level of q1. Another option allows providers to share in savings, but
the traditional Medicare payment model.
In either system, the new payment model allows the planner to choose positive values
for pb and p1, but must set all other payment parameters to zero. The planner’s problem is
now:
max
pb,p1
SW = q1 + q2   c(q1,q2)
s.t. FOC1 : c1   p1 =
 1
t (pb + p1q1   c)
FOC2 : c2 =
 2
t (pb + p1q1   c)
IR : pb + p1q1   c
Can the social planner achieve the point where c1 = c2 = 1?
FOC1 : 1  p1 =
 1
t (pb + p1q1   c)
FOC2 : 1 =
 2
t (pb + p1q1   c)
Solving yields:
p1 = 1 
 1
 2
pb = c  +
t
 2
  p1q 
1 = c  +
t
 2
 
(
1 
 1
 2
)
q 
1
This contract achieves the ﬁrst-best quality choices by providers, but note that when
 1 >  2, p1 < 0. If there is a non-negativity constraint on p1, then p 
1 = 0, and the ﬁrst-best
is not achievable (there is over-investment in q1, relative to q2, as in subsection ..).
not be accountable for increased costs; this can be modeled as bundled payment plus payment based on q1,
where the quality-based payment formula is kinked at the level of q1 from the traditional payment system.
Note that this treats the market as if consumers sign up with a given provider. In practice, consumers will be
assigned to ACOs based on where they receive most of their treatment (ie where they receive higher q1). This
clearly provides incentives to increase q1 to be attributed with patients (or possibly to reduce q1 to avoid
attribution). It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the trade-oﬀ between this type of manipulation
and increased consumer choice of providers.
Furthermore, for extreme parameter values with  1 <  2, it can be the case that p 
b < 0.
Similar to the results from Ma (), if  1 =  2, then quality can be thought of as
uni-dimensional, and the optimal contract includes only bundled payment. If we decrease
 1, then bundled payment results in a multitasking problem: providers over-invest in q2
relative to q1. Increasing p1 provides additional incentive to increase q1, and by reducing
pb by p1q1, we maintain the right overall level of reimbursement. Increasing  1 results in
the reverse problem, and we need to impose negative p1 while increasing pb.
Note that p1 < 1, implying that the optimal payment for a marginal unit of quality is
less than the beneﬁt of that marginal unit to patients. At the optimal quality level, the
marginal beneﬁt of quality to the consumer is equal to the marginal cost to the provider.
However, the quality-based payment to the provider need not cover the entire marginal
cost (and, in fact, should not, since setting p1 = 1 would result in ineﬃciently high
provision of q1). Only in the case of zero demand response to q1 is it optimal to set
marginal quality-based payment equal to marginal beneﬁt. When there is a demand
response, the provider is rewarded for increasing q1 not only through the direct payment
for quality p1, but also through an increase in demand. Here there is an important
interaction between quality-based payment and the existing incentive structure.
In this section, I’ve shown that quality-based payment can be used as a policy
instrument to address ineﬃciencies associated with traditional payment models.
However, the level of quality-based payment is dependent on the nature of the ineﬃciency
(in this case the unequal observability of the diﬀerent quality dimensions). Optimal
quality-based payment does not involve paying based on the marginal beneﬁt of quality;
rather, it varies with the demand response to diﬀerent dimensions of quality, and it is
plausible for the optimal quality-based payment to be negative. Quality-based payment
should be targeted at those aspects of quality that are least rewarded by the existing
payment system, relative to their social beneﬁt.
. E
The model above admittedly leaves out many potentially important characteristics of
health care markets, but the basic point that quality-based payment should be targeted at
addressing ineﬃciencies in the existing payment system is likely robust. The result in
section .. that the planner can achieve the ﬁrst best clearly depends on the number of
independent instruments equaling or exceeding the number of targets. A more realistic
case is where there are more than two dimensions of quality, and the number of
instruments is less than the number of targets, in which case the solution will be
second-best. However, the optimal policy will still depend on the observability of diﬀerent
quality dimensions. Other modiﬁcations to the model with fairly straightforward
implications include allowing for provider altruism or considering eﬀects of payment
contracts on provider entry, exit, and location decisions. In the rest of this section, I
consider two generalizations: patient heterogeneity in health status, and deadweight
losses associated with raising funds.
.. P    
Consider the following model of heterogeneity in patient health status. The unit measure
of consumers is divided into   sick types and (1   ) healthy types; 0 <   < 1. Sick types
have the same utility function as above, but healthy types only receive beneﬁt from quality
dimension q1: a healthy consumer traveling distance d to a physician choosing quality
(q1,q2) receives utility q1   ti. Each provider’s cost per sick patient is c(q1,q2), and the
cost per healthy patient is c(q1,0). Note that I assume providers must choose the same
value of q1 for all patients, but for all practical purposes choose q2 = 0 for healthy types.
When there are fewer instruments than targets, the optimal contract will also depend on whether diﬀerent
dimensions of quality are substitutes or complements. The planner will want to reward poorly observed
dimensions of quality, as well as dimensions that are complements of other poorly observed dimensions.
In this context, we can think of q1 as representing screenings and other care provided to all patients, and q2 as
representing chronic care management that is only provided to sick types.
Now there are two sources of market failure if payment takes the form of ﬂat
(non-risk-adjusted) bundled payment. The multitasking issues arising from diﬀerential
demand response that were highlighted in the previous section are still in force. In
addition, there is a creaming/skimping problem (as described in Ellis, ) in which
providers over-invest in q1 relative to q2 in order to attract healthier, less costly patients. If
 1 <  2, these distortions move in opposite directions and the relative magnitude of the
distortions will determine whether there is over- or under-investment in q1 relative to q2.
Otherwise, if  1    2, then there is over-investment in q1.
Several diﬀerent payment instruments could be used to address these distortions (note
that there are still two targets, so we will generally need two independent instruments).
As in section .., we can achieve the ﬁrst-best through implementing bundled payment
plus payment on one dimension of quality. The level of quality-based payment here is
dependent both on the relative observability of the two quality dimensions, as well as on
the diﬀerence in cost between healthy and sick types. In this case, the optimal
quality-based payment rewards the less-observed dimension of quality, as well as the
dimension of quality that sick types care about relatively more.
Alternatively, if the planner can observe patient type, risk-adjusted bundled payment
can lead to the ﬁrst-best. Note that only in the case where  1 =  2 will optimal risk
adjustment result in payment equal to cost for each type plus a constant. In fact, in some
cases with  1 >  2, optimal payments for treating healthy types will be below the cost of
providing care to those types. This observation that risk adjustment can drive quality
choices as well as selection incentives has been illustrated by Glazer and McGuire ().
Another issue that arises once we have heterogeneity in health status is the possibility
that the planner should induce specialization by providers, with one provider focusing on
sick patients and the other provider focusing on healthy patients. Physician specialization
will tend to increase social welfare when provider market power (t) is small, when there
are large numbers of each type of consumer (    1
2), when patients are able to sort well
( 1 and  2 are large), and when q1 and q2 are substitutes. Generally, if providers are
specializing, diﬀerent physicians should be assigned to diﬀerent payment contracts (or
multiple contracts should be oﬀered, with physicians selecting diﬀerent options).
.. D 
Up until this point, I have assumed that payments to providers are simply a transfer, and
thus do not reduce social welfare. However, it is worth noting that when quality is poorly
observed, payments to providers are much higher than the cost of providing care. In a
world of uniform, risk-neutral providers, it would be possible to raise all funds above the
true cost of care in a non-distortionary way by charging a ﬂat entry fee (provider proﬁts
net of entry fees could be set to zero).
A more interesting case involves deadweight loss associated with all taxation: here the
planner wants to minimize the cost of achieving socially optimal values of q1 and q2 (and,
accounting for deadweight loss, the optimal quality levels will be reduced). Consider ﬁrst
the case where the planner is free to choose positive values for pb, p1, and p2. In this case
there are more instruments than targets, and it is straightforward to see that the
cost-minimizing contract will set pb as low as possible, paying based on quality as much
as possible. This follows from the equation for the provider’s marginal proﬁt associated
with changes in quality dimension k:
  
 qk
=
  
 qk
(pb + p1q1 + p2q2   c)      
 c
 qk
+  pk
For any given level of payment, the marginal proﬁt is increasing more quickly in pkqk
than in pb: the planner can induce higher quality at the same cost by increasing pkqk and
reducing pb by equal amounts. Note that if pb is unconstrained, the planner can induce
optimal quality choices while setting provider proﬁt arbitrarily close to zero, by sending
In this light, it is curious that medical education is subsidized in most developed countries, rather than being
taxed.
Setting
1 p1
1 p2 =
 1
 2 will achieve the right balance between q1 and q2. Note that this payment formula includes
higher rewards for the less-observed dimension of quality, consistent with the results from the base model.
pb towards negative inﬁnity.
In section .., we found that when the planner can choose values of pb and p1, it is
optimal to set a positive value for p1 if and only if q2 is better observed than q1 (that is,
 2 >  1). When there is deadweight loss from taxation,  2 >  1 is suﬃcient but not
necessary for the optimal value of p1 to be positive. As the marginal cost of funds
increases, and as  1 and  2 decrease, inducing quality through bundled payment becomes
more costly relative to using quality-based payment. Consider the following extreme case:
as  2 goes to zero, it becomes impossible to induce higher values of q2 through bundled
payment. In this case, the planner will be able to achieve any given level of q1 more
cheaply by using quality-based payment than by using bundled payment.
Another way the planner can reduce the cost of implementing a given quality level is
by using non-linear quality-based payments. Consider a case where provider revenues are
given by     (pb + f (q1)), where f is a function chosen by the planner. Where there is no
uncertainty in the link between eﬀort and measured quality, the planner’s optimal f will
include a step discontinuity at q 
1 (the optimal level of q1). If we introduce uncertainty in
measured quality (by adding normally-distributed noise, for example), it will still be
optimal for f to provide the greatest marginal incentives in the neighborhood of q 
1.
This discussion also has implications for public quality reporting, which presumably
would increase the observability of the quality dimensions that are reported. So long as
the payer adjusts payment contracts optimally, we should always increase any  k if it is
costless to do so, because this will reduce the cost of implementing the optimal quality
levels. However, consider a case where  1 >  2, and payment is bundled: increasing  1
would exacerbate the multitasking problem associated with diﬀerential observability of
quality. The important point here is that (similar to the case of pay-for-performance) the
eﬀects of quality reporting will be dependent on the characteristics of payment contracts
and the ineﬃciencies associated therewith.
. C
My goal in this paper has been to address how we should think about
pay-for-performance and the market failures it can mitigate, not to provide a recipe for
implementation of a speciﬁc quality-based payment contract. As such, I have presented a
simple model of competition between health care providers, suﬃcient to illustrate a basic
point: quality-based payment should be used to address speciﬁc market failures in the
existing payment system. Quality-based payment is one instrument of many that payers
can use to come nearer to targets of provider quality.
In order to use quality-based payment eﬀectively, designers of payment systems need
to characterize the ineﬃciencies they aim to correct. We should expect that rewarding
some dimensions of quality will result in providers focusing on those dimensions. Thus,
quality-based payment should focus on the dimensions of quality that are most
underprovided in the existing payment system (as well as dimensions that are
complements of other under-provided dimensions, or substitutes to over-provided
dimensions of quality).
One major implication of this paper is that, in a payment system that already rewards
providers based on consumer demand, we should not additionally reward aspects of
quality to which there is relatively high demand response. Although for many quality
dimensions, it is diﬃcult to estimate demand response, we can state with some conﬁdence
that we should not reward patient satisfaction or patient experience measures. (If demand
responds to anything, it ought to respond to patient satisfaction.) I even argue that if it is
politically feasible, providers should be ﬁnancially penalized for having better patient
satisfaction scores, which is the opposite of current practice: both the QIP/IHI initiative in
California and the QOF in the U.K. include payment for patient satisfaction and/or use of
patient satisfaction surveys.
Whether this results in reductions in other dimensions of quality depends on the nature of the providers’
production functions, and whether diﬀerent dimensions of quality are complements or substitutes.
The insights from my model can be applied beyond multitasking problems arising
from failures of demand response to quality. In section .., I argued that quality-based
payment can be used to combat the problem of creaming and skimping—over-providing
quality to proﬁtable consumers and under-providing quality to unproﬁtable consumers.
The QOF is built on a capitated payment system with very little risk adjustment,
providing incentives for practices to attract healthy patients and avoid sick patients. All of
the QOF clinical measures (about half of all payments) are based on care for patients with
chronic disease, and payment is scaled by the number of patients with the disease in a
practice’s register. In this case, the QOF seems to be providing appropriate incentives to
combat selection of healthy patients by practices.
The current paradigm of pay-for-performance neglects the interaction between
quality-based payment and existing payment mechanisms. However, we cannot correctly
implement supply-side incentives for quality without understanding the incentives that
arise from demand-side responses within the existing payment system. When existing
systems reward some aspects of health care quality more than others (which in my model
arises from diﬀerential observability of quality dimensions), there are multitasking
problems in the absence of quality-based payment. Future research should seek to more
fully characterize the nature of the quality problem in health care markets, identifying
speciﬁc aspects of quality to be targeted by pay-for-performance contracts.
Pay-for-performance should then be used to address these speciﬁc ineﬃciencies, rather
than as a blunt instrument to simply “improve quality”.
2
Eﬀect of payment reform on quality of
primary care for coronary heart disease,
diabetes, and chronic kidney disease in the
United Kingdom
. I
I
 ,  N H S (NHS) implemented the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF), a new contract for General Practitioners (GP’s) that added
pay-for-performance (PP) components to the existing capitation-based contract.
Background on the history and details of the QOF are presented in section .. Although
there has been enthusiasm for PP from both public and private payers (Institute of
Medicine, ), the evidence on provider responses to quality-based payment isdecidedly mixed (Rosenthal and Frank, ).
There is some evidence that quality of care has improved under the new QOF contract.
Researchers from the National Primary Care Research and Development Centre
(NPCRDC), at the University of Manchester, have published several papers investigating
the eﬀects of the QOF on health care quality. Doran et al. () analyzed outcomes of the
QOF after the ﬁrst year, and found that the median practice earned .% of the available
points, as compared to the % that the NHS expected (and budgeted for). Since there
were no reliable baseline data, it was unclear whether the benchmarks were set too low or
whether quality of care rapidly improved after implementation of the QOF. In two
closely-related papers (Campbell et al., , ), the authors reviewed small random
samples of medical records at each of  practices in England in , , , and
. They found that the QOF was associated with a short-lived acceleration in quality
improvement for asthma and diabetes, but that there was no such eﬀect on care for
coronary heart disease (CHD). They also analyzed whether there was a diﬀerence in trend
between rewarded and unrewarded aspects of quality, ﬁnding that rewarded aspects
improved more quickly.
Two studies using large databases extracted from EMR systems of GP practices have
found conﬂicting results. Doran et al. () found that the new contract was associated
with signiﬁcant improvement across a wide range of quality indicators, in a dataset
including  English practices. Serumaga et al. () used a diﬀerent database from 
practices across the U.K. to analyze quality of care for hypertensive patients. They
precisely estimated zero eﬀect of the new contract on blood pressure monitoring, control,
treatment intensity, or health outcomes.
In , a hospital PP program was implemented in northwestern England rewarding
facilities based on  quality measures in ﬁve clinical areas. In a well-identiﬁed analysis
(Sutton et al., ) found that in-hospital mortality decreased signiﬁcantly for patients
admitted with rewarded conditions.
Outside the U.K., most studies tend to ﬁnd small eﬀects or no eﬀect of PP on quality of
care, though many programs provide smaller incentives than those seen in U.K. PP
schemes (Rosenthal and Frank, ). For example, private payers in California
implemented PP for medical groups starting in  and , but annual quality-based
payments per patient never rose above . Two papers on analyzing the California PP
experience did not ﬁnd any major eﬀects of PP on either rewarded or unrewarded
quality (Mullen et al., ; Rosenthal et al., ).
On the inpatient side, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services recently
completed a six-year demonstration of PP, in collaboration with Premier Inc. There is
evidence of initial improvements in care processes (Lindenauer et al., ; Werner et al.,
), but there seems to have been little or no eﬀect on patient outcomes (Jha et al., ;
Glickman et al., ).
In this study, we use the same dataset Serumaga et al. used to analyze hypertension
treatment, but analyze a range of quality of care measures for CHD, diabetes, and CKD.
Our work improves on the methods of Campbell et al. () and () by including a
much larger sample in terms of both number of practices and number of patients, and by
calculating performance monthly, as opposed to at four diﬀerent time points across ten
years. Our work also adds to the results from Doran et al. () by analyzing
intermediate outcomes quality measures, and not just process measures, which may be
only weakly associated with patient outcomes (Ryan et al., ).
. B   Q  O F
Tony Blair’s Labour government prioritized investment in the NHS, with total national
health spending increasing from .% of GDP in  to .% in  (OECD, ).
There were concerns about performance throughout the NHS, but measuring and
improving the quality of primary care was a particular focus for the government
(Department of Health, ). The ﬁrst step in this direction was the Performance
Assessment Framework (PAF), which assessed performance of Primary Care Trusts, but
this measurement at the level of the local health authority was seen as largely ineﬀectual
in improving health care quality (Department of Health, ; Chang, ). However, the
PAF set the stage for increased focus on performance of primary care providers, and by
 the NHS implemented the QOF for GP’s, likely the most ambitious PP contract ever
implemented in a health care setting.
By the early ’s, it was generally accepted that the quality of primary care in the
NHS left much to be desired, and that GP’s in the system felt overworked and underpaid
(Seddon et al., ; British Medical Association, ). One of the government’s priorities
from its  NHS Plan was to increase the supply of GP’s by .% within four years
(Department of Health, ; Doran and Roland, ). It was clear that the existing
General Medical Services (GMS) contract was insuﬃcient to encourage the level of GP
entry and retention that would be necessary to meet the target of increased GP supply.
After two years of negotiations between the NHS and British Medical Association
(BMA), including an initial agreement that was rejected by doctors, a new contract was
signed in June . The new contract bundled payments at the practice level, as opposed
to contracting with individual GP’s, and provided for increased payments to GP practices
beginning in ﬁscal year  (FY). Practices were also given increased ﬂexibility to
deﬁne their hours and scope of services beginning in FY.
As with the previous contract, the majority of payment was based on a capitated rate,
with rudimentary case mix adjustment. However, the new contract added the QOF,
which had a budget of £. billion (. billion) over three years, as compared to an overall
annual primary care budget of £. billion in FY (Doran et al., ; National Audit
Oﬃce, ). When the QOF was implemented, practices could receive additional
GP’s are either paid under a national GMS contract, or locally-negotiated Personal Medical Services (PMS)
contracts, which can vary considerably, but typically use the GMS as their framework.
The U.K. ﬁscal year runs April through March.
The capitation rate is adjusted based on patient age and sex, whether the patient is new to the practice, whether
the patient is in a nursing or residential home, mortality and long-term limiting illness rates in the ward where
the patient lives, wages in the practice’s ward, and rurality of the practice.
payments for their performance on  quality indicators, divided into three sections:
clinical care quality (including process and intermediate outcomes measures) for 
chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient experience. Up to  points could be
awarded to a practice based on its performance on the indicators, and the practice received
annual payment based on the number of points achieved (after adjusting for practice size
and chronic disease prevalence among the practice’s patients). For an average practice, the
QOF payment was £ per point in FY, increasing to £ per point in FY.
Since , the NHS has made minor changes to the QOF, but the overall structure has
remained consistent. The largest changes came in , when several new chronic
diseases—including chronic kidney disease (CKD)—were added to the list of clinical areas
in the QOF and the total number of points available was reduced to . Also, due to
higher performance on the measure than was originally expected, the lower thresholds for
quality payment were increased (practices would generally begin receiving payments at
% performance on the measures, instead of %). Some smaller changes to the list of
quality indicators were implemented in , along with minor adjustments to the
formula that determines a practice’s payment per QOF point.
The main stated purpose of the QOF was to improve quality of primary care in the
NHS. However, regardless of the eﬀects on health care quality, there were other important
eﬀects of the new contract. Spending on primary care increased from £. billion in FY
to £. billion in FY (National Audit Oﬃce, ). Between FY and FY, net
(pre-tax) income for non-salaried GP’s increased by over % in real terms (The Health
and Social Care Information Centre, ). Since then, real gross practice income has
declined slowly, with real net income decreasing by .% between FY and FY (The
Health and Social Care Information Centre, b). Although the eﬀect of the new
contract on GP morale is unclear, the total supply of GP’s increased by over  (%) in
the ﬁrst four years of the contract (British Medical Association, ; Whalley et al., ;
The government initially budgeted £. billion for FY; the overrun was largely caused by
higher-than-expected performance on the QOF.
The Health and Social Care Information Centre, a). Finally, the QOF required
practices to report performance through an electronic medical record (EMR) system and
reimbursed all of the costs of EMR adoption. Although over % of practices used EMRs
by , many practices have upgraded their systems and interoperability of systems has
increased markedly (Payne et al., ).
. M
.. D
We use The Health Improvement Network (THIN) data from Cegedim Strategic Data
(CSD, http://csdmruk.cegedim.com/), which are comprehensive electronic medical
records data from  UK GP practices, representing almost % of the UK population.
The THIN data include year of birth, sex, postcode-level socioeconomic measures, medical
encounters, diagnoses (Read codes), prescriptions, medical test values, referrals, and
transfers into and out of the practice.
We use data from all  practices that began using the Vision practice management
software by January , , and had acceptable mortality reporting (as deemed by CSD)
by March , . Our analysis dataset starts in April , and we begin including a
practice in our analyses when the practice has been using the Vision software for at least
 months and has acceptable mortality recording. We dropped  practice-months
from  separate practices whose data did not qualify for inclusion starting in 
(mostly due to adoption of Vision after January ).
In our analysis dataset, each observation represents a single patient in a single month,
from April  through March  (FY-FY). For inclusion, a patient must be
permanently registered with the practice for at least part of the month and must be at least
Over % of the new GP’s were salaried GP’s, who tend to work fewer hours and be lower paid than practice
partners. Salaried GP’s represented under % of the GP workforce in FY, and nearly % of the workforce in
FY.
 years old. We use Read codes (and, for CKD, creatinine values) to identify patients as
having any of  diagnoses. See table .. for descriptive statistics of our sample and
information on what sources we used to identify Read codes indicating diﬀerent
diagnoses.
.. Q 
We use the QOF Business Rules (available at http://www.pcc-cic.org.uk/) to calculate
monthly patient-level performance on the CHD, diabetes, and CKD quality indicators. We
classify each indicator as structure, process, or intermediate outcome; we run separate
analyses on processes, intermediate outcomes, and all indicators combined. The quality
score for process and intermediate outcome measures is the percentage of relevant
indicators met for the given patient. When running analyses on all indicators combined,
we weight CHD and diabetes performance according to the QOF quality weights as of
April , and CKD performance according to the April  weights. Each quality
score is the weighted percentage of relevant indicators met for the given patient. See
tables .. through .. for a list of quality indictors used in the analyses. We omit CHD
and diabetes indicators  and , which are smoking-related indicators that were calculated
diﬀerently starting in .
.. A
We present results from two separate sets of linear regression analyses, carried out at the
patient-month level. In the ﬁrst set of descriptive, non-parametric regressions, we estimate
the following patient ﬁxed-eﬀects regression equation:
qualityit =   +  t + diagnosesit     + ci +  it (..)
For human subjects protection, the THIN data only include year of birth, not exact date of birth. We include a
patient starting in the month when her expected age is at least . Note that this results in an inﬂux of
-year-old patients in July of each year, resulting in the sawtooth pattern of average age in table ..
Table ..: Descriptive statistics at the patient-month level (N= ,, patient-months;
,, unique patients in  practices)
Mean or percent over time
Variable Apr ’ ’ ’ ’
Age: mean (SD) . (.) 49
48 .
Male .% 50
48 .
Urban/Rural classiﬁcation
Urban .% 71
67 .
Town & fringe .% 13
8 .
Rural .% 8
6 .
Missing .% 16
13 .
Diagnosis present:
Anxiety disorders .% 13
8 .
Asthma .% 12
8 .
Atrial ﬁbrillation .% 2
1 .
Cancer (any except non-melanotic skin cancer) .% 4
2 .
metastatic cancer .% 1
0 .
Chronic kidney disease .% 8
1 .
Coronary heart disease .% 6
4 .
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease .% 3
1 .
Dementia .% 1
0 .
Depression .% 16
11 .
Diabetes (any) .% 8
3 .
diabetes with complications .% 2
0 .
Epilepsy .% 2
1 .
Heart failure .% 2
0 .
Hemiplegia .% 1
0 .
HIV/AIDS .% 1
0 .
Hypertension .% 17
11 .
Hypothyroidism .% 5
2 .
Left ventricular dysfunction .% 1
0 .
Liver disease, mild .% 1
0 .
Liver disease, moderate to severe .% 1
0 .
Myocardial infarction .% 2
1 .
Peptic ulcer disease .% 3
1 .
Peripheral vascular disease .% 2
1 .
Psychosis .% 1
0 .
Rheumatological disease .% 2
1 .
Stroke or TIA .% 3
2 .
Diagnoses in bold are the focus of this paper. Diagnoses in italics are coded based on QOF guidelines except
CKD, for which we supplement the QOF diagnosis codes with eGFR (see Denburg et al., ). All other
diagnoses are coded using the Khan et al. () adaptation of the Charlson Index, except anxiety disorders and
diabetes, which are coded based on CSD’s list of relevant Read codes.
Table ..: List of QOF quality indicators used for CHD analyses
Indicator Type Points
CHD . The practice can produce a register of patients with
CHD
Structure (S) 
CHD . The percentage of patients with newly diagnosed
angina who are referred for exercise testing and/or
specialist assessment
Process (P) 
CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD who have a
record of blood pressure in previous  months
P 
CHD . ThepercentageofpatientswithCHD,inwhomthelast
blood pressure reading (in last  months) is / or
less
Intermediate
Outcome (IO)

CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD who have a
recorded total cholesterol in previous  months
P 
CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD whose last mea-
sured total cholesterol (in last  months) is  mmol/l
or less
IO 
CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD with a record
in the last  months that aspirin, an alternative anti-
platelet therapy, or an anti-coagulant is being taken
(unless contraindicated)
P 
CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD who are cur-
rently treated with a beta blocker (unless contraindi-
cated)
P 
CHD . The percentage of patients with a history of MI (di-
agnosed after  April ) who are currently treated
with an ACE inhibitor
P 
CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD who have a
record of inﬂuenza vaccination in the preceding 
September to  March
P 
Table ..: List of QOF quality indicators used for diabetes analyses
Indicator Type Points
DM . The practice can produce a register of all patients with
diabetes mellitus
Structure (S) 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes whose notes
record BMI in the previous  months
Process (P) 
DM . The percentage of diabetic patients who have a record
of HbAc or equivalent in the previous  months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in whom the
last HbAc is . or less in last  months
Intermediate
Outcome (IO)

DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in whom the
last HbAc is  or less in last  months
IO 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a
record of retinal screening in the previous  months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes with a record
of presence or absence of peripheral pulses in the pre-
vious  months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes with a record
of neuropathy testing in the previous  months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a
record of blood pressure in the previous  months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes in whom the
last blood pressure is / or less
IO 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes with a record
of micro-albuminuria testing in previous  months
(exception for patients with proteinuria)
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes who have
a record of serum creatinine testing in previous 
months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes with protein-
uria or micro-albuminuria who are treated with ACE
inhibitors (or A antagonists)
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes who have a
recorded total cholesterol in previous  months
P 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes whose last
measured total cholesterol (in last  months) is 
mmol/l or less
IO 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes who have
a record of inﬂuenza vaccination in the preceding 
September to  March
P 
Table ..: List of QOF quality indicators used for CKD analyses
Indicator Type Points
CKD . The practice can produce a register of patients with
CKD
Structure (S) 
CKD . The percentage of patients on the CKD register whose
notes have a record of blood pressure in the previous
 months
Process (P) 
CKD . The percentage of patients on the CKD register in
whomthelastbloodpressurereading,measuredinthe
previous  months, is / or less
Intermediate
Outcome (IO)

CKD . The percentage of patients on the CKD register with
hypertension who are treated with an angiotensin con-
vertingenzyme inhibitor(ACE-I)or angiotensinrecep-
tor blocker (ARB), unless a contraindication or side ef-
fects are recorded
P 
where t is the month (ranging from - for April  to  for March ), the   vector
contains the coeﬃcients of interest, and diagnosesit is a vector with one indicator for each
diagnosis given in table ...
Our estimates of the eﬀect of the new GP contract on quality of care come from the
following patient ﬁxed-eﬀects model:
qualityit =   +  1   montht +  2   month2
t +  3   pre_postt + (..)
 4   pre_postt   montht +  5   pre_postt   month2
t +
month_of_yeart    1 + month_of_yeart   pre_postt    2 +
diagnosisit     + ci +  it
where montht is the month (ranging from - for April  to  for March ) and
month_of_yeart is the calendar month, to control for seasonality. pre_postt is a vector with
an indicator for each possible policy regime: for CHD and diabetes analysis, the
pre-policy period is FY-FY, FY is the phase-in period, and FY-FY is the
post-policy period. CKD was added to the QOF in April , so for CKD analyses,
pre_postt divides FY-FY into three additional periods: April  to November 
is the post-QOF, pre-CKD period; December  to March  is a phase-in period for
CKD; and FY-FY is post-QOF, post-CKD. All reported standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level.
.. D         QOF
If there is an eﬀect of the QOF on quality of care, then that eﬀect need not be restricted to a
short time period after implementation of the QOF. Indeed, it is plausible that the QOF
payment reforms cause long-run diﬀerences compared to what would have been the case
in the absence of payment reform, and these quality diﬀerences may not be constant over
time. Thus the ideal analysis would calculate the present discounted value of inﬁnite
stream of quality provided under the QOF, compared to the present discounted value of
the stream of quality that would have occurred absent payment reform.
However, putting aside our inability to estimate these diﬀerences into the future, our
analysis is hampered by lack of a strong source of identiﬁcation of shorter-term eﬀects. If
the QOF had been implemented for some practices but not for others, or if
implementation had been staggered across time—in short, if we had a control group for
our analyses—we could empirically estimate the counterfactual with more conﬁdence.
Without a control group, the best we can do is identify eﬀects oﬀ of the extrapolation of
trends from the pre-QOF period.
Economic theory is unable to provide much guidance for our modeling decisions in
this regard. If the market is simply moving from one static equilibrium to another, any
eﬀect of the QOF will be a jump at the time of implementation, and the eﬀect size will be
constant over time. However, it is plausible that practices are in a dynamic equilibrium,
characterized by secular changes in quality over time. Furthermore, payment reform
might result in dynamic changes (for example, causing practices to innovate more
CKD indicators were made public in late November .
Sadly, policies are often implemented without evaluation in mind.
quickly); in this case, the long-term eﬀect of payment reform may be diﬀerent from the
eﬀect at implementation. Our baseline analysis allows diﬀering quadratic trends in each
time period, but it is unclear ex ante whether to expect dynamic changes, and models
using quadratic trends may be overly sensitive if there are changes in curvature.
For these reasons, we present results for a variety of alternative model speciﬁcations
that allow for diﬀering extrapolation of pre-QOF trends. We present results for the our
estimated eﬀect on quality in the ﬁrst month as well as the eﬀect averaged over diﬀerent
post-implementation time periods. (results in the Appendix).
. R
Results for CHD and diabetes quality are presented in ﬁgures .. and .., and in table
... Payment reform was associated with meaningful improvement in rewarded
dimensions of quality of care for CHD and diabetes. Overall performance on CHD
measures increased by . percentage points (SE = 0.69), and diabetes performance
increased by . percentage points (SE = 0.98). We ﬁnd improvement in both
process-based measures and intermediate outcomes, though for diabetes the process
measures showed greater improvement than outcomes measures.
Results for CKD quality are presented in ﬁgure .. and table ... We ﬁnd that
overall CKD quality improved by . percentage points (SE = 0.27) in  when CKD
was added to the list of QOF clinical domains. Both process and outcomes measures
improved signiﬁcantly, but the improvement in process measures was relatively small.
CKD quality also improved in , when there were incentives for quality of care for
other clinical groups, but not for CKD patients. One potential complication with
interpreting these positive eﬀects is that many patients with CKD also have another
condition that was rewarded under the QOF in . However, separate analyses of CKD
patients without any other relevant diagnoses also ﬁnd signiﬁcant quality improvement in
 (see table A.. in the Appendix), pointing to the possibility of positive spillovers
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Figure ..: Mean CHD quality scores by month, adjusted for diagnoses and patient ﬁxed eﬀects.
Data points are taken from month dummies in a non-parametric regression model. Trend lines are
taken from a seasonality-adjusted parametric regression model allowing for diﬀerent pre-QOF and
post-QOF quadratic trends and intercepts. Estimates for the phase-in period (April  to March
) are based on extrapolating quadratic trends from the pre-QOF period.
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Figure ..: Mean diabetes quality scores by month, adjusted for diagnoses and patient ﬁxed ef-
fects. Data points are taken from month dummies in a non-parametric regression model. Trend
lines are taken from a seasonality-adjusted parametric regression model allowing for diﬀerent pre-
QOF and post-QOF quadratic trends and intercepts. Estimates for the phase-in period (April 
to March ) are based on extrapolating quadratic trends from the pre-QOF period.
Table ..: Regression results for CHD and diabetes quality
CHD Diabetes
All Outcome Process All Outcome Process
Variable   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)
month  0.0566 0.120  0.195     0.169   0.282    0.0825
(0.0527) (0.0806) (0.0442) (0.0729) (0.103) (0.0840)
month  0.0055     0.0040    0.0076     0.0052     0.0068     0.0050  
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0015)
post 10.1    11.7    9.74    8.39    5.99    13.3   
(0.666) (1.02) (0.559) (0.975) (1.36) (1.12)
post month 0.309    0.257    0.372    0.388    0.438    0.351   
(0.0095) (0.0131) (0.0089) (0.0150) (0.0190) (0.0158)
post month 0.00267     0.0002 0.0056    0.0033    0.0052    0.0030   
(0.00009) (0.0001) (0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Seasonally-adjusted eﬀect estimates across varying post-reform time periods
 month 9.91    10.9    9.96    8.32    5.79    13.4   
(0.685) (1.06) (0.572) (0.986) (1.34) (1.17)
 months 10.7    11.6    10.9    9.32    6.94    14.4   
(0.810) (1.25) (0.675) (1.17) (1.59) (1.37)
 year 11.7    12.3    12.2    10.6    8.42    15.5   
(0.985) (1.52) (0.821) (1.41) (1.94) (1.65)
 years 13.9    13.9    15.2    13.4    11.8    18.0   
(1.41) (2.18) (1.18) (2.00) (2.78) (2.32)
 years 16.4    15.3    18.8    16.5    15.6    20.8   
(1.94) (2.97) (1.62) (2.72) (3.79) (3.14)
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. April  is coded as month = . All regressions include patient ﬁxed-eﬀects, month-of-year
dummies (to control for pre-QOF seasonality), month-of-year dummies interacted with post (to control for
post-QOF seasonality), and diagnosis indicators. Coeﬃcients for trends and intercept in the phase-in period are
suppressed.
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Figure ..: Mean CKD quality scores by month, adjusted for diagnoses and patient ﬁxed eﬀects.
Data points are taken from month dummies in a non-parametric regression model. Trend lines are
taken from a seasonality-adjusted parametric regression model allowing for diﬀerent quadratic
trends and intercepts in three time periods: FY-FY, FY-FY, FY-FY. Estimates for the
two phase-in periods (April  to March , and December  to March ) are based on
extrapolating quadratic trends from the previous period.
Table ..: Regression results for CKD quality
All Outcome Process
Variable   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)
month  0.0170  0.0818  0.0301
(0.0490) (0.0992) (0.0840)
month  0.0015  0.0037   0.0013
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0011)
- 2.34    4.25    1.15
(0.596) (1.12) (0.687)
- month 0.327    0.450    0.119
(0.0224) (0.0986) (0.113)
- month  0.0077     0.0035  0.0036
(0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0040)
post_ 8.82    7.37    4.66 
(0.866) (2.12) (2.26)
post_ month 0.118    0.491    0.427   
(0.0216) (0.0741) (0.0928)
post_ month  0.0001  0.0006  0.0037   
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Seasonally-adjusted eﬀect estimates across varying post-reform time periods
FY vs FY
 month 5.44    6.19    2.66   
(0.274) (0.442) (0.199)
 year 6.63    7.73    4.73   
(0.398) (0.753) (0.393)
 years 8.62    10.1    7.67   
(0.676) (1.33) (0.729)
FY vs pre
 month 11.1    18.4    3.62
(2.25) (4.21) (2.43)
 year 11.7    20.5    4.08
(2.77) (5.18) (3.00)
 years 12.4    22.8    4.47
(3.42) (6.40) (3.72)
FY vs pre
 month 2.19   4.29    1.40 
(0.609) (1.16) (0.636)
 year 3.67    6.78    2.08 
(0.903) (1.71) (0.956)
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level. April  is coded as month = .
All regressions include patient ﬁxed-eﬀects, month-of-year dummies (to control for
pre-QOF seasonality), month-of-year dummies interacted with - and post_
(to control for diﬀerences in seasonality in each time period), and diagnosis indicators.
Coeﬃcients for trends and intercept in the phase-in periods are suppressed.
from other clinical groups to patients with CKD. It is possible that some practices may
have anticipated the inclusion of CKD in the QOF; however, we are unaware of any public
information pointing to the addition of CKD until late November .
Across all regressions, we ﬁnd that quality scores ﬂatten out after initial improvements
in the ﬁrst two to three years after implementation. Also notable across clinical domains is
change in seasonality of quality scores associated with payment reform. Quality scores at
the end of the ﬁscal year improved signiﬁcantly more than quality scores in the middle of
the ﬁscal year. The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is that QOF payments
are rewarded based on performance at the end of the ﬁscal year, so there is greater
incentive to improve quality of care in March than at any other time. This is compounded
by a -month look-back on many of the quality indicators: a test done between January
and March can ”count” for two years of QOF calculations.
Appendix tables A.. through A.. present results from alternative model
speciﬁcations and from practice-level ﬁxed eﬀects models. We consistently ﬁnd positive
results across diﬀerent models, though the size of the eﬀects varies. We do not place much
stock in the extrapolations more than the ﬁrst two years past implementation of payment
reform, since the estimates become increasingly sensitive to the assumed counterfactual.
With one exception, when our baseline variable quadratic model ﬁnds positive eﬀects
averaged across any time period less than two years, all other models also ﬁnd positive
eﬀects.
We ﬁnd somewhat higher estimated eﬀects using practice-level ﬁxed-eﬀects models
than using patient ﬁxed-eﬀects models, particularly in the case of diabetes. This is
consistent with the possibility of case mix changes, where diabetic patients diagnosed in
Pre-QOF seasonality in outcomes scores are most likely explained by natural seasonal variation in blood
pressure.
Estimates of components of the  2 vector in regression equation (..) are highly signiﬁcant (results not shown).
In some cases, extrapolation of the pre-reform quadratic trend far enough implies (impossible) negative quality
scores by .
The exception is the practice-level ﬁxed-eﬀects model for CKD process quality (table A..).
the post-reform period are healthier or more compliant than those who were diagnosed
before payment reform.
. D
With the adoption of payment reform in , primary care practices in the NHS
improved rewarded process- and outcomes-based quality scores across several clinical
domains. Furthermore, there were small improvements in care for CKD after payment
reform and before quality of care for CKD patients was included in the QOF. While there
are other possible ways practices could have diverted eﬀort from unrewarded aspects of
quality, this provides some evidence that multitasking may not have been a major
problem with the QOF.
Our results are broadly consistent with those from Campbell et al. () and (),
though unlike the previous studies, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements in CHD quality.
Previous studies have looked at quality trends through  and noted that quality
leveled oﬀ after improving in the ﬁrst year of payment reform.
This points to the importance of not interpreting evaluations of NHS payment reform
as reﬂecting the eﬀect of ”pay-for-performance”. The overall payment reforms also
included an initial huge increase in average payments per patient; it could be the case that
practices responded to an increase in payment, rather than to PP. The clean experiment
of the eﬀectiveness of PP, per se, would be to assign some practices to the QOF and
others to comparably increased capitation levels. In at least one case where this approach
was taken, there were quality improvements in the PP group relative to the group that
received higher non-quality-based payment (Gertler and Vermeersch, ).
Another major result of payment reform was investment in of EMRs by practices. Since
all practices in our sample had robust EMR systems prior to payment reform, we are
unable to measure the degree to which this EMR adoption resulted in quality
improvements. However, this is arguably a strength of our paper, since we are able to
disentangle QOF-related eﬀects from eﬀects due to technology adoption.
. C
We found initial improvements in quality of care with payment reform in the NHS, but
quality of care was fairly constant after the initial improvement. Further research is
warranted to understand the degree to which initial improvements in quality are
attributable to PP, rather than other aspects of the  payment reforms. Researchers
should also explore whether diﬀerent, possibly dynamic, incentives could have
encouraged further improvement after the ﬁrst couple years of implementation.
3
Speciﬁcity of healthcare providers’
responses to pay-for-performance
incentives in the United Kingdom
. I
I
 ,  N H S (NHS) in the United Kingdom (UK)
implemented the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) for primary care practices,
perhaps the most ambitious pay-for-performance (PP) scheme ever tried in a health care
setting. The QOF builds on the previous capitation payment system by increasing
ﬁnancial rewards for practices that provide higher quality care, as measured by a range of
structural, process-based, and outcomes-based indicators.
As originally implemented, practices received additional payment for their
performance on  quality indicators, divided into three sections: clinical care quality for chronic diseases, organization of care, and patient experience. Up to  points could
be awarded to a practice based on its performance on the indicators, and the practice
received annual payment based on the number of points achieved (after adjusting for
practice size and chronic disease prevalence among the practice’s patients). Since ,
there have been minor changes to the QOF, including payment on clinical care quality for
several additional chronic diseases, a reduction in total points available to , and minor
changes to the formulas that translate performance into QOF points and calculate
payment per QOF point.
There is evidence that payment reform was associated with substantial improvements
in quality of care for a range of conditions (Campbell et al., ; Doran et al., ;
Richardson, ). It is unclear, however, whether improvements in quality of care were
due to increased average payments per patient, public reporting of quality data, or the
speciﬁc quality-based payment incentives in the QOF. To begin to attribute eﬀects to the
PP aspects of the QOF, it is necessary to look more precisely at which practices responded
to incentives, and how they responded. Furthermore, the QOF is also expensive: spending
on primary care increased from £. billion in ﬁscal year  (FY) to £. billion in
FY, and the NHS now spends approximately £ billion per year on the QOF (National
Audit Oﬃce, ; Cashin, ). We do not know how eﬃciently the QOF translates this
increased spending into improved quality and whether the incentive structure in the QOF
could be altered to achieve similar quality levels with lower spending.
There is mixed evidence on how well providers base their decisions on the speciﬁc
marginal ﬁnancial incentives they face. For example, in the Quality Improvement
Program in California described in Rosenthal et al. (), the medical groups who were
the worst performers at baseline improved the most despite having almost no ﬁnancial
incentive to do so, having started so far below the targets for receiving payment. If
providers fail to respond strategically to the incentives they face under PP programs,
there are important implications for the design of such programs. On the one hand, if
The U.K. ﬁscal year runs April through March.
providers engage in ”schmeduling”—responding heuristically to imperfectly perceived
incentives—we will be unable to use the traditional principal-agent optimization
framework to predict the eﬀects of any given set of incentives (Liebman and Zeckhauser,
). On the other hand, such dulled responses to speciﬁc incentives might imply that
the precise details of PP programs are not terribly important.
. S    QOF
Broadly speaking, the QOF ﬁnancially rewards higher performance on a wide range of
quality indicators. However, at a more granular level, the marginal incentives facing
practices at diﬀerent levels of baseline performance are quite diﬀerent. For each quality
indicator k, payment is linearly increasing between a ﬂoor (q) and a ceiling (qk). Figure
.. shows how points are calculated for each QOF indicator, where each indicator k is
associated with a maximum number of points ϕk, and points translate linearly into
payment in pounds. Practices at the ceiling do not receive additional payment for further
improvement, but there are strong marginal incentives for those operating between q and
qk.
One type of behavior where there are markedly diﬀerent incentives facing practices
above and below the ceilings is exception reporting, which is reporting that patients are
inappropriate for certain performance measures. When a practice claims an exception for
a patient on a given indicator, the patient is removed from the denominator for calculation
of performance on that indicator. A practice operating above the ceiling gains nothing
when it reports an exception (and in fact reduces payment, since the size of the
denominator enters the formula calculating the payment per point). However, a practice
operating between the ﬂoor and the ceiling increases its payment by claiming an exception
on a patient for whom the practice is failing to satisfy the indicator. Gravelle et al. ()
found that practices above and below payment ceilings did in fact behave diﬀerently when
reporting exceptions, with those below the threshold inﬂating their exception reports by
qjk
Points
ϕk

  q=0.4 qk q=0.25
FY-
FY-
Figure ..: Calculation of QOF points achieved on each indicator.
some %.
Beyond the discontinuity created by payment ceilings, many of the indicators
themselves create discontinuous incentives. The intermediate outcomes indicators reward
a practice for the percentage of relevant patients whose last test value in a ﬁscal year is
below a threshold. See table .. for a list of the CHD and diabetes intermediate
outcomes measures included during the ﬁrst  years of the QOF. Collectively, these
indicators represent between % and % of all QOF points available, translating to
roughly £, per year for an average practice. The distributions of practice performance
on these indicators are presented in appendix ﬁgures A.. through A...
Consider the cholesterol indicators (CHD  and DM ), which reward practices based
on the percentage of patients whose last total cholesterol measurement in the ﬁscal year is
below  mmol/l ( mg/dl). A practice could potentially increase its payment by
aggressively retesting patients whose numbers are just above  mmol/l, but not patients
whose numbers are just below  mmol/l, before the end of the ﬁscal year. Furthermore,
only practices operating between the ﬂoor and ceiling have an incentive to engage in this
type of behavior. It is unclear whether practices will respond to the discrete  mmol/l
threshold, and if they do, whether it is only the practices that are between the payment
ﬂoor and ceiling.
Finally, the QOF rewards performance as measured at the end of the ﬁscal year (in
March). Richardson () presents evidence that the QOF introduced clear seasonality in
quality scores, with the highest scores consistently coming in March. Again, if practices
are responding to the true marginal incentives they are facing, we should only observe
this type of seasonality in practices operating below the performance ceiling.
In this paper, we investigate the degree to which practices respond to the speciﬁcs of
QOF incentives introduced by payment ceilings, test value thresholds, and
end-of-ﬁscal-year measurement.
Table ..: Intermediate outcomes quality measures for CHD and diabetes
Indicator Years Ceiling* Max points*
CHD . The percentage of patients with CHD, in
whom the last blood pressure reading (in
last  months) is / or less
All  ||
CHD . ThepercentageofpatientswithCHDwhose
last measured total cholesterol (in last 
months) is  mmol/l or less
All || ||
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in
whom the last HbAc is  or less in last 
months
FY-  
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in
whom the last HbAc is . or less in last 
months
FY-  
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in
whom the last HbAc is . or less in last 
months
FY-  
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in
whom the last HbAc is  or less in last 
months
FY-  
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in
whom the last HbAc is  or less in last 
months
FY-  
DM . The percentage of patients with diabates in
whom the last HbAc is  or less in last 
months
FY- ||NA 
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes in
whom the last blood pressure (in last 
months) is / or less
All || ||
DM . The percentage of patients with diabetes
whose last measured total cholesterol (in
last  months) is  mmol/l or less
All || 
* Several of the ceilings and maximum points were changed in FY or in FY. In these cases, the ﬁrst number
refers to FY-, the second number refers to FY-, and the third number refers to FY-.
. T 
The following model is our framework for considering how we expect GP practices to
respond to the change from largely capitated payment to the new contract’s mix of
capitation and quality-based payment. We assume that there are J providers in
monopolistic competition for patients who have varying health care conditions (denoted
by K-dimensional vector  , where element k of vector   is one if the patient has condition k
and zero otherwise). Each provider chooses K-dimensional quality vector q provided to
all patients, and each patient chooses a provider, resulting in increasing and weakly
concave demand for each provider  (q).
Provider j’s cost of providing care of quality qj to consumer i is given by
ci
(
qj
)
= c
(
qj
)
  åk  k ik, where c is a strictly convex cost function and  k is a cost weight
given to condition k. We deﬁne the prevalence of condition k among patients of practice j
as
Pjk  
å
 j
i=1  ik
 j
where  j is demand for provider j, in number of patients. A practice’s average cost per
patient is then c
(
qj
)
= c
(
qj
)
  åk  kPjk.
.. P       
We abstract from the details of case-mix adjustment and relatively small fee-based
payments, and model payment as a simple bundled (capitated) rate per patient pb. Proﬁt
We do not explicitly model patient choices, but we assume a positive demand response to quality.
The additivity of conditions’ weights is a simplifying assumption that will have little eﬀect in the empirical
section. The salient point is that patients with any given condition cost more than those without the condition,
ceteris paribus.
We will assume proﬁt-maximization by providers, but the model is robust to at least some forms of provider
altruism. We can think of c as the cost function net of the provider’s altruism-related beneﬁt per patient. If the
provider’s altruism-related beneﬁt per patient is a weakly concave function of q, then c will remain convex, and
all our conclusions will continue to hold.
to a constant-returns-to-scale provider j before payment reform is
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Assuming an interior solution, the K ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum are  k:
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We will assume that condition prevalences are independent of provider quality choices
(i.e. Pjk   qj,  k). That is, the size of the practice can depend on q, but the mix of patients
in the practice does not. In this case, the ﬁrst-order conditions simplify to the following
marginal-revenue-equals-marginal-cost expression,  k:
  j
 qjk
  pb =
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l
 lPjl +  j  
 c
 qjk
(..)
Note the implication that
 qjk
 pb > 0: even in the absence of PP, there will be positive
quality choices, and we should expect increased payment per patient to result in increased
quality. Furthermore (and again assuming Pjk   qj  k), providers serving patient
populations with higher condition prevalences should provide lower quality care.
.. P       
The  payment reforms included payments for provider performance on  quality
indicators, with  of the indicators rewarding processes or intermediate outcomes for
patients with particular conditions. Each indicator k is associated with a maximum
number of points (ϕk), and we use qjk to denote the percentage of practice j’s relevant
Unrewarded dimensions of quality can be included in the model with ϕk = 0.
patients for which the quality indicator was met. Each indicator has a ﬂoor (q) below
which the practice receives no points and a ceiling (qk) above which the practice receives
no additional points beyond ϕk. Points are awarded linearly between the ﬂoor and the
ceiling, so the points awarded on indicator k are given by
g
(
qjk   q
qk   q
)
where we deﬁne g(x) = max(0,min(1,x))  x   R. Each point is worth a ﬁxed amount  
for the average-sized practice, and the payment for practice j is scaled linearly with the
practice size,  j. Condition-speciﬁc indicators are further scaled by the square root of the
practice’s prevalence of the condition,
√
Pjk, relative to the nationwide average square root
of the prevalence,
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Thus, after payment reform, provider j’s proﬁt is
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where   is the size of the average practice, so  
  represents the per-patient payment per
QOF point.
The K ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior maximum are  k:
For all indicators, the ﬂoor in FY-FY was %, and the ﬂoor was increased to % beginning in FY. The
ceilings for indicators range from % to %.
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As in section .., we consider the special case where Pjk   qj  k, reducing the
ﬁrst-order conditions to the following marginal-revenue-equals-marginal-cost expression,
 k:
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Note that marginal revenues are discontinuous at q and qk, and there will be solutions
where the ﬁrst-order conditions do not hold with equality. Figure .. depicts marginal
revenue as a function of quality on a single rewarded indicator, both before and after
payment reform. After payment reform, providers with marginal cost (MC) less than MC
will choose qj > qk. Providers with MC   [MC1,MC2] will choose qj = qk. Providers with
MC   (MC2,MC3] will choose qj  
(
q, qk
)
. Finally, providers with MC > MC3 will
choose qj < q.
If the QOF had provided incentives for only a single dimension of quality, the
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Figure ..: Marginal revenue (MR) for a single dimension of rewarded quality, before and after
QOF, and three possible marginal cost curves.
theoretical predictions would follow easily from the ﬁrst-order conditions and from ﬁgure
... We would expect all practices to improve, with practices having MC   (MC2,MC3)
improving more than others (at least in percentage terms). However, Sherry () has
shown that when a PP program rewards multiple dimensions of quality, the expected
direction of change is unknown even for rewarded dimensions. This comes from the
possibility that diﬀerent dimensions of quality may be either substitutes or complements;
investments in one dimension of quality may change the marginal costs of other
dimensions.
For this reason, we focus not only on comparing practice behavior before and after
QOF, but also on comparing behavior of practices above and below ceilings for each
indicator (qk). This gets around the problem noted by Sherry (): given a continuous
cost function, there is a discontinuity in marginal incentives at the ceiling. Under the
In theory, we would also want to compare practices above and below payment ﬂoors, q, since these practices
would also face diﬀerent marginal incentives. However, it is very rare for practices to perform below q.
assumption that when averaged over diﬀerent practices, marginal incentives for a
behavior vary continuously except for the discontinuity at qk, we can apply a regression
discontinuity design to estimate whether practices are responding to the marginal
incentives implied by ceilings. This assumption amounts to practices having cost
functions such that their marginal cost for condition k is not determinative of their
marginal cost for other conditions, and would follow (for example) from a setup where
the Pj vector varies stochastically across practices.
As discussed in section ., the structure of marginal incentives around the payment
ceilings implies that proﬁt-maximizing providers should behave diﬀerently depending on
whether they are operating above or below the ceilings. In particular, this paper will
investigate whether practices vary their patterns of exception reporting, medical testing,
and end-of-ﬁscal-year behavior based on the speciﬁc marginal incentives they face.
. M
We use The Health Improvement Network (THIN) data from Cegedim Strategic Data
(CSD, http://csdmruk.cegedim.com/), which are comprehensive electronic medical
records data from  UK GP practices, representing almost % of the UK population.
The THIN data include year of birth, sex, postcode-level socioeconomic measures, medical
encounters, diagnoses (Read codes), prescriptions, medical test values, referrals, and
transfers into and out of the practice. These data have been used previously by Serumaga
et al. () to analyze eﬀects of the QOF on treatment of hypertension.
We use data from all  practices that began using the Vision practice management
software by January , , and had acceptable mortality reporting (as deemed by CSD)
by March , . Our analysis dataset starts in April , and we begin including a
practice in our analyses when the practice has been using the Vision software for at least
 months and has acceptable mortality recording. We dropped  practice-months
from  separate practices whose data did not qualify for inclusion starting in 
(mostly due to adoption of Vision after January ).
Calculating practice performance. Using version . (March , ) of the ”New GMS
Contract QOF Implementation Dataset and Business Rules”, published by the Department
of Health, we calculate each practice’s performance on all CHD and diabetes quality
indicators, except those related to smoking cessation. For each indicator in each month,
we determine whether each practice is above or below the payment ceiling. Finally, we
create overall measures of marginal incentives for CHD and diabetes by calculating the
percent of points in the disease domain for which the practice is above the payment
ceiling, denoted ceilCHD and ceildia, respectively.
Results are presented in the following two sections, which use diﬀerent analysis
datasets extracted from the THIN data. Section . analyzes exception reporting by
practices, and uses data at the practice-month level, looking only at the post-QOF period
(since there were no exception reports before QOF). Section . analyzes the probability
that a practice will retest a patient’s cholesterol, as a function of the baseline cholesterol
value. For these analyses we construct a dataset in which each observation is a single
cholesterol test taken within two years before or after QOF implementation (FY-FY).
. E 
Performance on each indicator is calculated as the number of patients who meet the
indicator (numerator) divided by the number of patients with the relevant condition
(denominator). Each practice may claim exceptions, excluding patients from the
denominator for various reasons: if the patient fails to visit the practice after several
attempts to schedule the patient, if the patient is on maximal drug therapy, or if the
patient is otherwise inappropriate for the indicator. However, if a practice claims an
Calculation of denominators for the smoking cessation indicators fundamentally changed in .
Note that some of the payment ceilings change in  or .
A practice above most of the ceilings will have a high value for these variables, and will face low marginal
incentives to improve quality, relative to a practice below the ceilings.
exception for a patient, the patient will only be excluded from indicators that the patient
fails to meet. That is, if an excepted patient meets a given indicator, she will still be
included both in the numerator and denominator for that indicator.
For a practice below the threshold, reporting an exception weakly increases payment:
either the patient is meeting the indicator, so the exception does not apply; or the patient
fails to meet the indicator, so the exception increases the practice’s performance on the
indicator (decreasing the denominator by ). For a practice above the ceiling, claiming an
exception weakly reduces payment, because payment per point is increasing in the
reported prevalence Pjk. Again, if the patient is meeting the indicator, the exception does
not make a diﬀerence. But if the patient fails to meet the indicator, then the practice’s
denominator size is reduced, and the improvement in performance does not increase
payment, since the marginal payment for performance increases is zero for a practice
above the ceiling.
We analyze patterns of exception reporting using data at the practice-month level,
subset to post-QOF data (starting April ). We estimate the following
practice-ﬁxed-eﬀects regression model separately for CHD and for diabetes:
Pr_Xjkt =   +     ceiljk,t 1 +  j +  FYt +  montht +  jkt (..)
where Pr_Xjkt is the proportion of exceptions claimed among patients with condition k
(where k is CHD or diabetes) in practice j at time t, where t is denominated in months.
 FYt and  montht are ﬁxed eﬀects vectors for ﬁscal years and months of the year,
respectively. We expect   to be negative, since a practice should claim fewer exceptions
when its lagged performance places it above more ceilings.
Results for CHD and diabetes are presented in table ... We ﬁnd no eﬀect of ceilings
on exception reporting for CHD, but ﬁnd that practices performing above more ceilings
for the diabetes indicators are less likely to claim diabetes exceptions. Increasing by one
standard deviation ( percentage points) the percent of diabetes-related points for which
Table ..: Regression results for CHD and diabetes exception reporting associated with the prac-
tice’s performance relative to payment ceilings
CHD Diabetes
  SE   SE
ceiljk,t 1 0.000412 (0.001030)  0.00158  (0.000754)
FY 0.000254 (0.000262) 0.00118    (0.000340)
FY  0.0000911 (0.000249) 0.00157    (0.000421)
FY  0.000717   (0.000236) 0.000889  (0.000399)
FY  0.000682  (0.000276) 0.000311 (0.000372)
FY  0.00114    (0.000299) 0.000539 (0.000407)
FY  0.000947   (0.000309) 0.000238 (0.000396)
May 0.000699   (0.000264) 0.000328 (0.000333)
Jun 0.000579   (0.000212) 0.000280 (0.000260)
Jul 0.000869    (0.000258) 0.000415 (0.000278)
Aug 0.000658  (0.000257) 0.000193 (0.000247)
Sep 0.000814    (0.000238) 0.00102    (0.000296)
Oct 0.00135    (0.000248) 0.00143    (0.000300)
Nov 0.00180    (0.000265) 0.00221    (0.000321)
Dec 0.00176    (0.000314) 0.00201    (0.000358)
Jan 0.00399    (0.000389) 0.00548    (0.000360)
Feb 0.00442    (0.000361) 0.00823    (0.000556)
Mar 0.00555    (0.000496) 0.0130    (0.000762)
constant 0.00662    (0.000746) 0.00860    (0.000603)
Pr_Xjkt mean 0.00434 0.00571
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
N = 28,233 practice-months
The dependent variable is the percentage of a practice’s patients with the given diagnosis for whom the practice
claims an exception during a given month. FY and April are the omitted categories. Practices are weighted by
the number of patients in the practice with the relevant diagnosis, averaged over the post-QOF period. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level, and regressions include practice ﬁxed
eﬀects.
the practice is above ceilings decreases the number of patients for whom the practice
claims an exception by .%.
Also of note is the strong seasonality in exception reporting. For both CHD and
diabetes, practices report many more exceptions in the ﬁnal months of each ﬁscal year
(January through March) than they do earlier in the year. This is consistent with practices
waiting until near the end of the ﬁscal year to decide whether it is advantageous to claim
exceptions. Table .. includes similar regressions in which we interact the ceiljk,t 1
variable with months of the year. We ﬁnd that the seasonal pattern of exception reporting
is less evident when practices are above payment ceilings than when they are below
ceilings. This suggests that practices use excepetion reporting strategically near the end of
the year to improve reported performance on those measures where they are performing
below ceilings.
To further analyze the degree to which practices were strategically using exception
reporting, we compared each practice’s payments at the end of each ﬁscal year to what the
practice would have been paid had the practice not claimed any exceptions. We found
that on average, exception reporting increased practices’ CHD payments by .% and their
diabetes payments by .%. However, over % of the time, a practice’s CHD QOF
payments would have been higher had the practice reported no CHD exceptions. Over %
of practices, through claiming exceptions, lost more than .% of the CHD income they
would have received had they claimed no exceptions. Over % of the time, a practice’s
diabetes payments would have been higher had the practice reported no diabetes
exceptions.
Although there have been concerns that some practices overused exception reports to
boost payments (Gravelle et al., ), to our knowledge there was never concern that
This is calculated as  0.00158 0.21/0.00571 = 0.058.
The data are not suﬃcient to calculate actual payments, but we can accurately determine the percent diﬀerence
between the payment actually received and the payment that would have been received had the practice not
claimed any exceptions. Furthermore, some exceptions apply across several chronic conditions, so we were
unable to calculate the full eﬀects of the exception reporting.
Table ..: Regression results for CHD and diabetes exception reporting associated with the prac-
tice’s performance relative to payment ceilings
CHD exceptions Diabetes exceptions
  SE   SE
ceiljk,t 1  0.00164 (0.00143)  0.00200 (0.00171)
FY 0.000215 (0.000263) 0.00102   (0.000352)
FY  0.000121 (0.000249) 0.00144    (0.000427)
FY  0.000766   (0.000238) 0.000724 (0.000409)
FY  0.000731   (0.000276) 0.000120 (0.000380)
FY  0.00120    (0.000300) 0.000320 (0.000418)
FY  0.001000   (0.000310)  0.0000176 (0.000413)
May  0.00163 (0.000849)  0.00206 (0.00133)
Jun  0.00133 (0.000712)  0.00168 (0.00132)
Jul  0.000953 (0.000793)  0.00115 (0.00136)
Aug  0.000591 (0.000773)  0.00217 (0.00128)
Sep  0.000954 (0.000733)  0.000447 (0.00154)
Oct  0.00105 (0.000865)  0.000695 (0.00145)
Nov  0.000317 (0.000805) 0.000898 (0.00142)
Dec  0.000774 (0.000764) 0.00117 (0.00150)
Jan 0.00132 (0.00133) 0.00444   (0.00157)
Feb 0.00545    (0.00143) 0.00905    (0.00194)
Mar 0.00894    (0.00257) 0.0274    (0.00351)
May ceiljk,t 1 0.00321  (0.00130) 0.00370  (0.00175)
Jun ceiljk,t 1 0.00258  (0.00108) 0.00309 (0.00175)
Jul ceiljk,t 1 0.00246  (0.00112) 0.00246 (0.00179)
Aug ceiljk,t 1 0.00160 (0.00117) 0.00377  (0.00168)
Sep ceiljk,t 1 0.00238  (0.00110) 0.00228 (0.00200)
Oct ceiljk,t 1 0.00335   (0.00127) 0.00335 (0.00190)
Nov ceiljk,t 1 0.00292  (0.00125) 0.00203 (0.00190)
Dec ceiljk,t 1 0.00352   (0.00110) 0.00124 (0.00212)
Jan ceiljk,t 1 0.00367  (0.00176) 0.00153 (0.00206)
Feb ceiljk,t 1  0.00157 (0.00199)  0.00135 (0.00258)
Mar ceiljk,t 1  0.00468 (0.00322)  0.0215    (0.00463)
constant 0.00422    (0.00103) 0.00361  (0.00142)
Pr_Xjkt mean 0.00434 0.00571
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
N = 28,233 practice-months
The dependent variable is the percentage of a practice’s patients with the given diagnosis for whom the practice
claims an exception during a given month. FY and April are the omitted categories. Practices are weighted by
the number of patients in the practice with the relevant diagnosis, averaged over the post-QOF period. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level, and regressions include practice ﬁxed
eﬀects.
practices would inﬂate their payment by failing to claim exceptions. For this reason it
would seem that the expected costs of underreporting exceptions would be low. Hence,
our analysis suggests that practices in general were not overly sophisticated in their
strategic use of exception reporting.
A related question concerns the budgetary impact to the government of allowing
exception reporting. Note that as practices across the country report exceptions, they
reduce the average reported prevalence of the relevant conditions (
 
Pk from section
..), thereby slightly increasing payment for all other practices. Therefore, a close
approximation to the budgetary impact of allowing exception reporting is simply the
increase in average points attained due to practices reporting exceptions. We ﬁnd that
allowing exception reporting increased practices’ mean points attained from .% to
.% on CHD indicators, and from .% to .% on diabetes indicators. At least in
these two disease domains, allowing exception reporting only had a small budgetary
impact.
. R      
The quality indicators in table .. create discrete cutoﬀs in cholesterol, blood pressure,
and HbAc values: above the cutoﬀ the practice gets zero points for the patient, and below
the cutoﬀ the practice gets full points. Furthermore, only a patient’s most recent test result
in a ﬁscal year matters. Given that cholesterol, blood pressure, and HbAc values are
somewhat noisy, retesting a patient below the cutoﬀ could result in reduced quality
scores, and retesting a patient above the cutoﬀ could result in increased quality scores,
even in the absence of any change in the patient’s underlying health.
In this section, we focus on the cholesterol indicators (CHD  and DM ) and analyze
whether the cutoﬀs introduced a discontinuity in a patient’s likelihood of having her
cholesterol retested before the end of the ﬁscal year. We expect patients with scores just
This approximation will be slightly biased downward if practices performing worse are more likely to report
exceptions.
below the cutoﬀ to be less likely to be retested than patients with scores just above the
cutoﬀ. Analyses in this section are at the patient-month level, and we subset to data from
the two years before and after implementation (FY-). All standard errors are robust to
clustering at the practice level, and to heteroskedasticity (where appropriate).
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Figure ..: Unadjusted mean percentage of patients being retested before the end of the ﬁscal
year, by cholesterol value. Tests in the last month of the ﬁscal year are dropped, and % conﬁdence
intervals are robust to clustering at the practice level. N = 1,852,621 cholesterol tests.
Figure .. presents the unadjusted probability of a patient with a given cholesterol
value to be retested before the end of the ﬁscal year, before and after QOF. There is a
discontinuity at the cutoﬀ value of  mmol/L both in the pre and post period: patients
with a cholesterol value of . mmol/L are substantially more likely than those with a
value of  mmol/L to be retested before the end of the ﬁscal year. This discontinuity is
larger in the post-QOF period, and the diﬀerence between the pre and post probabilities is
greatest just above the cutoﬀ. This is consistent with what we would expect from the
incentives practices face: the patients with cholesterol values just above the cutoﬀ are most
likely to drop below in the next test.
It is certainly possible that patient characteristics other than cholesterol values aﬀect the
probability of the patient being retested. For this reason, we analyzed the same data using
a patient ﬁxed-eﬀects model, and controlling for the month of the year. Results presented
in ﬁgure .. show similar ﬁndings, with the discontinuity at the cutoﬀ is larger in the
post period than in the pre period. Note however that the ﬁxed eﬀects matter: probability
of retesting in this model is non-decreasing in the initial cholesterol value, and the
diﬀerence between the pre and post period does not attenuate as cholesterol increases
further above the cutoﬀ.
To quantify the change in the discontinuity, we estimate the following patient
ﬁxed-eﬀects regression equation:
Pr[retestit] =   +  1   postQOFt +  2   1[cholit>5] + (..)
 3   postQOFt   1[cholit>5] +  i +  montht +  it
Results are presented in table ... In the pre-QOF period, a patient with a cholesterol
value over  mmol/L was . percentage points more likely to be retested during the
same ﬁscal year, compared to the same patient with a cholesterol value below  mmol/L.
After the QOF, this diﬀerence increased by . percentage points to . percentage points.
The QOF had a strong overall eﬀect on patients’ probabilities of having their cholesterol
retested, but there were only incentives for cholesterol testing among patients with CHD,
diabetes, or history of stroke or transient ischemic attack (TIA). Next, we analyze
separately patients with and without these diagnoses. Figure .. plots the unadjusted
likelihood of retesting, comparing between patients with and without the relevant
diagnoses before and after QOF. The ﬁgure shows that patients with the diagnoses were
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Figure ..: Results from a linear probability model regression predicting the probability of choles-
terol retesting before the end of the ﬁscal year. We control for patient ﬁxed-eﬀects and month-of-
year indicators, and drop tests in the last month of the ﬁscal year. % conﬁdence intervals are ro-
bust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level. N = 1,852,621 cholesterol tests from
755,240 unique patients.
Table ..: Regression results for cholesterol retesting
Equation .. Equation ..
  SE   SE
 1   postQOF  0.00668  (0.00308) 0.00848   (0.00258)
 2   chol > 5 0.186    (0.00415) 0.113    (0.00260)
 3   postQOF   chol > 5 0.0578    (0.00316) 0.00313 (0.00287)
 4   Dx 0.190    (0.00494)
 5   postQOF   Dx  0.00556 (0.00359)
 6   chol > 5  Dx 0.0154   (0.00483)
 7   postQOF   chol > 5  Dx 0.0382    (0.00439)
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
N = 1,858,232 cholesterol tests from 757,412 unique patients
The dependent variable in each regression is the likelihood of the patient having his or her cholesterol retested
before the end of the ﬁscal year. A constant and indicator variables for months of the year are included in the
model and their coeﬃcients are suppressed. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. Equation .. includes patient ﬁxed eﬀects, and equation .. accounts for patient-level
random eﬀects.
always more likely to be retested, but the change in retesting patterns is speciﬁc to the
rewarded diagnoses.
To quantify the change in the discontinuity for patients with and without the
diagnoses, we estimate the following patient-level random-eﬀects regression equation:
Pr[retestit] =   +  1   postQOFt +  2   1[cholit>5] + (..)
 3   postQOFt   1[cholit>5] +  4   Dxit +  5   postQOFt   Dxit +
 6   1[cholit>5]   Dxit +  7   postQOFt   1[cholit>5]   Dxit +
 montht +  it
Results are presented in the rightmost two columns in table ... Coeﬃcient  3
represents the change from pre-QOF to post-QOF in the diﬀerence in probability of
retesting above and below the mmol/L cutoﬀ. The precisely estimated zero implies that
The presence of the diagnoses does not change enough to precisely estimate a patient ﬁxed eﬀects model. A
random eﬀects model controlling for the month of the test produces nearly identical results to the unadjusted
means.
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Figure ..: Unadjusted mean percentage of patients being retested before the end of the ﬁscal
year, by cholesterol value and presence or absence of the following diagnoses: CHD, diabetes, and
stroke/TIA. Tests in the last month of the ﬁscal year are dropped, and % conﬁdence intervals are
robust to clustering at the practice level. N = 1,852,621 cholesterol tests.
the change observed from the pooled analysis—regression equation ..—only occurred
among those with the rewarded diagnoses. Our estimate for the change among those with
the relevant diagnoses is  3 +  7 = 0.0414 (SE = 0.00432), implying a . percentage
point pre-QOF to post-QOF diﬀerence in diﬀerence of probabilities of retesting above and
below  mmol/L.
Furthermore, as with exception reporting, we might expect practices above and below
payment ceilings to behave diﬀerently when it comes to retesting patients. For this
analysis, we subset to patients with CHD and/or diabetes, but without history of stroke or
TIA (since we did not extract quality data on stroke measures). For patients with both
CHD and diabetes, we code the practice as being below the payment ceiling if below the
ceiling for either the CHD or diabetes measure (since the practice has marginal incentives
to retest that are similar to practices below the ceiling for a patient’s only diagnosis,
among patients with either CHD or diabetes, but not both). Appendix ﬁgure A..
presents results of a patient ﬁxed-eﬀects regression comparing the probability of
cholesterol retesting before and after QOF, among practices above or below the relevant
payment ceilings given the patient’s diagnosis.
Related regression results are presented in appendix table A.., in which we estimate
the following patient-level ﬁxed-eﬀects regression equation:
Pr[retestit] =   +  1   postQOFt +  2   1[cholit>5] + (..)
 3   postQOFt   1[cholit>5] +  4   over_ceilingit +
 5   postQOFt   over_ceilingit +  6   1[cholit>5]   over_ceilingit +
 7   postQOFt   1[cholit>5]   over_ceilingit +  montht +  it
Coeﬃcient  7 is the relevant triple-diﬀerence estimate: it shows the eﬀect of QOF on
Note that before the QOF, there was no deﬁned performance ceiling or target performance on the measures, so
we deﬁne ceilings as if the practices were facing the FY ceilings. We should expect no discrete eﬀect of a
practice’s performance relative to ceilings before QOF.
the diﬀerence between practices above and below ceilings in the jump in retesting at a
total cholesterol of  mmol/L. We would expect the negative coeﬃcient that we ﬁnd:
practices above the ceiling have less incentive to distort their cholesterol testing behavior
around the  mmol/L threshold. However, the result is largely driven by pre-QOF
diﬀerences between practices above and below (theoretical) ceilings.
. C
In this chapter, we have shown that practices responded signiﬁcantly to various marginal
incentives introduced by the QOF. Practices altered their behavior based on whether they
were above or below payment ceilings, based on the month of the ﬁscal year, and based on
a patient’s cholesterol value relative to a discrete threshold. Research showing that the
QOF was associated with overall improvements in quality cannot attribute those
improvements to PP or public reporting of results, per se. Another plausible explanation
is that the QOF drastically increased overall payments to practices, and it was this wealth
eﬀect that caused improved performance. In this study we found eﬀects that would be
hard to explain as being caused by anything other than the PP or public reporting
aspects of the QOF.
However, practice responses were also not purely sophisticated responses to the
ﬁnancial incentives they faced. For example, practices commonly reported exceptions
when the exception actually decreased the practice’s payment. Practices also increased
retesting of patients with cholesterol values above the  mmol/L threshold, but did not
decrease retesting of patients with values below the threshold. Furthermore, the increased
retesting was not concentrated among patients with values slightly above the threshold,
but remained among patients far above the threshold (who were unlikely, upon retesting,
to drop below the threshold).
This paper suggests that payers implementing PP contracts should be aware of the
speciﬁc incentives they are creating, and consider the possibility of unintended
consequences. However, at least in the context of primary care practices in the NHS, some
unintended consequences that might have been predicted by economic theory did not
materialize.
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A
Appendices
A. A   : P  P
Proposition. Given a single payment contract, any equilibrium must be symmetric: q1a = q1b;
q2a = q2b.
Proof. Assume (q1a,q2a) ̸= (q1b,q2b) in equilibrium. Deﬁne strictly concave average proﬁt
function for provider j: A j
(
q1j,q2j
)
= p1q1j + p2q2j + pb   (1  pc)   c
(
q1j,q2j
)
. Note that
in equilibrium, each provider will operate in a region where A j is weakly decreasing:
otherwise, the provider could increase q1 and/or q2 to weakly increase demand and
strictly increase average proﬁts.
Claim. A a > 0 and A b > 0. If A j = 0 and A  j > 0, then provider j can strictly
increase proﬁts by choosing
(
q1, j,q2, j
)
. If A a = A b = 0, then at least one provider
can strictly increase proﬁts by decreasing q1 or q2, since providers are operating in a
weakly decreasing region of A j. (Note that we are not at the corner where
j    a,b , k    1,2  qkj = 0 or
  j
 qkj = 0, since (q1a,q2a) ̸= (q1b,q2b) by assumption.)
Deﬁne vector v = (q1b   q1a, q2b   q2a)
T. Since A j is strictly concave and
(q1a,q2a) ̸= (q1b,q2b), DA a (q1a,q2a)   v ̸= DA b (q1b,q2b)   v.
Deﬁne D+F(x)   v = lim
h 0+
F(x+hv) F(x)
h and D F(x)   v = lim
h 0 
F(x+hv) F(x)
h : these are
the one-sided directional derivatives of F at x in the direction of v.
Since
 + a
 qka =
   b
 qkb and
   a
 qka =
 + b
 qkb ,
D+ a (q1a,q2a;q1bq2b)   v = D  b (q1b,q2b;q1aq2a)   v   D+ a and
D  a (q1a,q2a;q1bq2b)   v = D+ b (q1b,q2b;q1aq2a)   v   D  a.
If both providers are maximizing proﬁts, then the following four inequalities must hold:
 a   [DA a (q1a,q2a)   v] + A a (D+ a   v)   0
  a   [DA a (q1a,q2a)   v]   A a (D  a   v)   0
 b   [DA b (q1b,q2b)   v] + A b (D  a   v)   0
  b   [DA b (q1b,q2b)   v]   A b (D+ a   v)   0
  A a (D+ a   v   D  a   v)   0
A b (D  a   v   D+ a   v)   0
  D+ a   v = D  a   v   D    v
This implies that the provider ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum must hold with
equality:
 a   [DA a (q1a,q2a)   v] + A a (D    v) = 0
 b   [DA b (q1b,q2b)   v] + A b (D    v) = 0
 
 a   [DA a (q1a,q2a)   v]
A a
=
 b   [DA b (q1b,q2b)   v]
A b
Claim.  a ̸=  b and A a ̸= A b. Suppose  a =  b: A a ̸= A b, since
DA a (q1a,q2a)   v ̸= DA b (q1b,q2b)   v. But in this case the provider with lower average
proﬁts could strictly increase proﬁts by mimicking the provider with higher average
proﬁts. Suppose A a = A b: again,  a ̸=  b since
DA a (q1a,q2a)   v ̸= DA b (q1b,q2b)   v. In this case the provider with lower demand
could strictly increase proﬁts by mimicking the provider with higher demand.
Assume  a >  b. This implies that A a < A b, since otherwise, provider b could
strictly increase proﬁts by choosing quality vector (q1a,q2a). Since A j is strictly concave,
 DA a (q1a,q2a)   v  >  DA b (q1b,q2b)   v . This implies  
 
 
 a [DA a(q1a,q2a) v]
A a
 
 
  >
 
 
 
 b [DA b(q1b,q2b) v]
A b
 
 
 , which is a contradiction. By the same line of
argument, we cannot have  b >  a. Therefore, (q1a,q2a) = (q1b,q2b) in equilibrium.
A. A   
Table A..: Regression results for CKD quality, subsetting to patients without CHD, hypertension,
diabetes, or history of stroke
All Outcome Process
Variable   (SE)   (SE)   (SE)
month  0.295    0.432    0.333 
(0.0877) (0.134) (0.136)
month  0.0060     0.0083     0.0075  
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0024)
- 4.86    6.67    6.82   
(1.13) (1.74) (1.75)
- month 0.458    0.591    0.613   
(0.0474) (0.0753) (0.0685)
- month  0.0041 0.0001  0.0141   
(0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0032)
post_ 5.05    5.39    1.17
(1.26) (1.95) (1.92)
post_ month 0.490    0.728    0.674   
(0.0234) (0.0373) (0.0336)
post_ month 0.0028    0.0044    0.0027   
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
seasonally-adjusted 4.68    6.45    6.80   
estimate for - (1.17) (1.79) (1.81)
seasonality-adjusted 4.58    4.06    3.09   
estimate for jump in  (0.432) (0.689) (0.618)
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level. Unless otherwise noted, all
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at p < .. April  is coded as month = . All regressions
include patient ﬁxed-eﬀects, month-of-year dummies (to control for pre-QOF seasonality),
month-of-year dummies interacted with - and post_ (to control for
diﬀerences in seasonality in each time period), and diagnosis indicators. Coeﬃcients for
trends and intercept in the phase-in periods are suppressed.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CHD quality using six diﬀerent patient ﬁxed-eﬀects models over
seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model       
All
quality
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Outcome
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Process
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. -.NS -.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001. All regressions include
diagnosis indicators, and models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CHD quality using six diﬀerent practice-level ﬁxed-eﬀects models
over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model       
All
quality
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . -.NS -.p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Outcome
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .NS -.p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Process
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. -.NS -.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. All models include practice ﬁxed eﬀects, and observations are weighted by the practice’s
average number of CHD patients over the time period. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at
p < 0.001. Models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for diabetes quality using six diﬀerent patient ﬁxed-eﬀects models
over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model       
All
quality
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Outcome
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL .p<. .p<. .NS .NS .NS -.NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ .NS .NS .NS .NS .NS .NS .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Process
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001. All regressions include
diagnosis indicators, and models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for diabetes quality using six diﬀerent practice-level ﬁxed-eﬀects mod-
els over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model       
All
quality
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . . .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Outcome
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. .NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Process
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. All models include practice ﬁxed eﬀects, and observations are weighted by the practice’s
average number of diabetic patients over the time period. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at
p < 0.001. Models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CKD overall quality using six diﬀerent patient ﬁxed-eﬀects models
over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model      
FY
vs
FY
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . -.p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
m
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001. All regressions include
diagnosis indicators, and models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CKD outcomes quality using six diﬀerent patient ﬁxed-eﬀects
models over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model      
FY
vs
FY
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
m
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001. All regressions include
diagnosis indicators, and models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CKD process quality using six diﬀerent patient ﬁxed-eﬀects models
over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model      
FY
vs
FY
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . .p<. .p<. .NS .NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .NS .NS .NS .NS .NS .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
m
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at p < 0.001. All regressions include
diagnosis indicators, and models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CKD overall quality using six diﬀerent practice-level ﬁxed-eﬀects
models over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model      
FY
vs
FY
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
m
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VL .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. All models include practice ﬁxed eﬀects, and observations are weighted by the practice’s
average number of patients over the time period. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at
p < 0.001. Models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CKD outcomes quality using six diﬀerent practice-level ﬁxed-
eﬀects models over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model      
FY
vs
FY
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . .p<. -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
m
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VL .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. All models include practice ﬁxed eﬀects, and observations are weighted by the practice’s
average number of patients over the time period. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at
p < 0.001. Models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
Table A..: Eﬀect estimates for CKD process quality using six diﬀerent practice-level ﬁxed-eﬀects
models over seven diﬀerent time periods
Time period for estimated eﬀects, in months
Model      
FY
vs
FY
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL . . . . . .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VL .NS .NS -.NS -.NS -.NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .NS .NS .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
m
FY
vs
pre
yr . . .
(.) (.) (.)
yr . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CL . . . .
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VL .NS .NS .NS -.NS
(.) (.) (.) (.)
CQ .NS .NS .NS .NS
(.) (.) (.) (.)
VQ .p<. .p<. .p<. .p<.
(.) (.) (.) (.)
All models allow for intercept shifts in each period. yr and yr include no trends (comparing adjusted average
quality scores for the one year or two years, respectively, around period changes). CL has a constant linear
treand, VL allows variable linear trends, CQ assumes a constant quadratic trend, and VQ allows variable
quadratic trends, as in the baseline analysis.
Units are percentage points of quality scores. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the practice level. All models include practice ﬁxed eﬀects, and observations are weighted by the practice’s
average number of patients over the time period. Unless otherwise noted, all estimates are signiﬁcant at
p < 0.001. Models including linear or quadratic trends control for seasonality.
A. A   
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator CHD : The percentage of patients with
CHD, in whom the last blood pressure reading (in last  months) is / or less.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator CHD : The percentage of patients with
CHD whose last measured total cholesterol (in last  months) is  mmol/l or less.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabates in whom the last HbAc is  or less in last  months.
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
Apr 2000  Apr 2001  Apr 2002  Apr 2003  Apr 2004  Apr 2005  Apr 2006  Apr 2007  Apr 2008  Apr 2009  Apr 2010 
Quality 
Score 
Payment ceiling 
Percentile 
99 
 
90 
 
75 
 
50 
 
25 
 
10 
 
1 
Payment floor 
Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabates in whom the last HbAc is . or less in last  months.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabates in whom the last HbAc is . or less in last  months.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabates in whom the last HbAc is  or less in last  months.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabates in whom the last HbAc is  or less in last  months.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabates in whom the last HbAc is  or less in last  months.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabetes in whom the last blood pressure (in last  months) is / or less.
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Figure A..: Distribution of practice scores on indicator DM : The percentage of patients with
diabetes whose last measured total cholesterol (in last  months) is  mmol/l or less.
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Figure A..: Results from a linear probability model regression predicting the probability of
cholesterol retesting before the end of the ﬁscal year. We control for patient ﬁxed-eﬀects and
month-of-year indicators, and drop tests in the last month of the ﬁscal year. N = 736,479 choles-
terol tests from 200,867 unique patients with CHD and/or diabetes, but not with history of stroke
or TIA.
Table A..: Regression results for cholesterol retesting, comparing practices above and below pay-
ment ceilings
  SE
 1   postQOF 0.0134  (0.00580)
 2   chol > 5 0.167    (0.00415)
 3   postQOF   chol > 5 0.0627    (0.00699)
 4   over_ceiling 0.00159 (0.00569)
 5   postQOF   over_ceiling  0.0266    (0.00772)
 6   chol > 5  over_ceiling 0.0393    (0.00816)
 7   postQOF   chol > 5  over_ceiling  0.0218  (0.00979)
  p < 0.05,    p < 0.01,     p < 0.001
N = 736,479 cholesterol tests from 200,867 unique patients with CHD and/or diabetes, but not with history of
stroke or TIA, dropping tests in the last month of the ﬁscal year. The dependent variable in each regression is the
likelihood of the patient having his or her cholesterol retested before the end of the ﬁscal year. A constant,
indicator variables for months of the year, and patient ﬁxed eﬀects are included in the model and their
coeﬃcients are suppressed. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the practice level.
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